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PREFACE

In vi ew of the unsettled

oontl~

t ion of European diplomacy

~

today, it should be profitable to stutl.y the antecedents of the
World War

j

n more det ail than h ~ therto.

Suoh a study will make

olearer the steps taken by national leaders then - steps whi oh

at that time were unable to avold war.
Many Europeen statesmen who were in power before thp. World
War have been regarded by some authors as

ha~

ng har. some degree

of responsibility for that oonfliot - and Prestdent l'oinca~e of
France was no exception.

The reoent publl oati on of the Docu

ment s Diplomat1 ques Fran%ai s

has prov!. iI.ed adilt ti onal inform"ltJ.on,

as have other late publlcations on the World War.

It is my pur

pose in tM s thes1 s to investigate the part played by Preel ilent
POinoare during the days between June 28 end August 4, 1914, a!rl
to determlne, as far as posslble, whether there

~s

any justifica

tion for oharges of responsibillty made against him by oertain
writers, some of whom have been trylng to clear thelr own country
of the blame for starting the World War as set forth in the socalled "war gu!.lt" clauss, Article 231, of the Treaty of Versa 111es
of 1919.

..
..,
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RAYM01\]) POI l\ CARE'S ROLE IN TEE NEGOTIATIONS
FROt: JUNE 28 to AUGUST 4, 1914

CHAPTER I

"

IRTRODUCTION

•
R~'l!1ond

Po'ncare was born, August l'O, 1860, at Bar-If'!-duc,

in the department of Meuse - wh! ch had formerly been a part of
the province of 10rra! np..

He wap tr, e son of f, l colas Po:; ncare,

who was a c'v!l servant and rneteorolog1 st.

R~'mond Poir,care Waf'

educated at the Uni versi ty of Par; s anc. was called to thp. bar
Paris.

j

n

He was also the editor of Voltaire, end j.n 1909 he became

a member of thp. French Aoademy.
Thepo11 t1 cal posts held by Raymond Po l. ncare werp. many.
188'7 he was elected deputy for t.he
M;nistry as Vin!ster of EducatIon.

~'eusp..

In

In 1893 he entered the

TIe was a moderate republican.

In the following year he became Mi I'i ster of Finance, and he shoYl
~

ed great abilHy In the me;tters of natIonal financfl and the budget.
In the late 1890' s he was V! ce Presl dent of the Chamber of ])ep"ti es.
Apart from fi nance, hi s !.nterests were

'n -foreign

affairs.

He was

,

an intense nationalist.

From January', 1912, to 1913, he was Premier,

or Pre 81 dent of the Council of Mi.n!. st ers, and hel d the portfol!
of Min! ster of Foreien Aff'l.irs. l

0

In Y.ovembe:r', 1912, m .th ll. Po'n

/

c .are I s approval, the Grey-Cambon letters conoern; ng pOBa i ble future
naval cooperation between England and France in the event of a war
2
"ere exchanged.
. He W!la elected President of the Frenoh Repub110
on January 17, 1913.

Dur!ne the t17ing days whi oh feillowed,

it

.*
1. Bemus, Pierre, article in Enc~'clopaedia Britannica, XVIII, 115-6.
2. ~'erri01rs of Raymond Po! ncar~, I, 113-5;
cf., Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, 94-6.
~

,

was fortunate for France that her pres1 dent was a strong rather
than a weak personality.l

..

When Raymond Poincare, then Premier, was elected President
on January 17, 1913,
to obtain the

~.

requir~

t took two ballot s by the National Assembly
absolute majority for election.

Thus,
~

even in the Parliament of Francs, opinion was div~ded.2

He

. received messages of oongratulations from the other states.

A

fOrrrler Berlin newspaper ed~ tor says tt.at President Po1.ncare
exaggerated when he decided that these

tel~rams were~videnoe

that nall Europe saw in the vote of the National Assembly a
happy pledge of peace. n3

M. IevolBky, the Russian Ambassador

in Paris, wrote on the day before the election .of
car~,

"Tomorrow.

• are the Prss1denti. al elections •

that POi ncare may not be beaten.
us. n4

Pres~dent

Po~n-

God grant

I t will be a o'a tastrophe for

Y. Isvolsky felt that he could influence PresIdent P01n

/'

care to b/:'! favorable to RUSSI a and unfavorahle to Germany and
Austria-Hungary.
In June, 1914, President Po~. noar~ asked M. V~v1an1 to form
a ministry.

This was rather difficult because some of M. Viv1ani

'I!'

colleagues oppose" the three-year milHary serv1 ce law whi ch had
been restored 1.n 1913 and whi oh was favored by the President.
/

After one unsuccessful attempt, M. V1 v1 ani, agree:rng to pem1t . the
three-year military service law to rem.a in in effeot until an ade
quate subst1tute could be devised, was given a vote of oonf1dence

1.
2.
3.
4.

Munro, Governments ot Europe, 425.
Ibid., 420.
Wolft, The Eve ot t914, 271.
DickinsOn, WernaTIOii'al Anarchy, 322.

....
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on June 16.

l 'hus the stage was set for the ACti on of 1914.1

l'hat action was ,begun, not In France, but ln Austr 1 a-Hungary •

•

On June 28, 1914, occurred the assass 1 nation whlhh set ~n
motion the cl!a 1 n of eTents WhlCh w"re to lead d 1 rectly to the
beg~nn1nB

of the World War.

"

On that day Archduke FrqncJ s Ferdl

nand, he 1 r to the Emperor of Austria, and hIs wife, the DucheR8
of Hohenberg, were vj
ter:r:itory.

s1t~nB

in Jlosnl. a, wh 1 ch was then Austrian

l'hey were on an official

jevo to witr.ess the army maneuvers.

V 1 S 1.t

1n the town of Sara

Two attempts were made by

Bosnlan subjects to assasslne.te the Archduke and Ms w1 fe; the
second attempt, by Gavrilo Princlp, a Bosn 1 an Bubject, was S'lccess
ful. 2

On June 28, President Po:!.ncare was at· Longchamps for the
Grand Prl.x when he was !nformed by telegram of the assass 1 rat:!on.
After returning to the f~Y8ee, he sent h 1 8 condolences to the
Emperor Franr;is Joseph, for whtch the Emperor later thanked Mm. 3
On the same day M. V1 viani, Pres1 dent of the Council of

M~

ni at ers

and ylnister of Foreign Affairs, Bent condolences through Ambassa
dol' Duma;ne, the French Ambassador in Vlenna, to the Emperor.
VeuHlez atre I!Upr~s de Gouvernernent imp~rie1
et' rOyal l'interpr~te des plus ' sinc~ref!condoleances
du Gouvernernel't de la Republi que a 1 nst que des
sentiments d'horreur que lui infp~re 1 'attentat
dont ont ete vl. ctl.mes
Serajevo Son Altesse imper:! ale
l'Arch~duc hertHer et Madame la duchesse
de Hohenberg. 4

a

On the following day M. Dumaine reported to the Foreign Office.
Apr~sm'aToir

assure de 8a grat!tuGe pour
dea profondea condol~ances du Uouven5e
ment de 1 a Repub11QUe, dont Votre Excellence m'aTa1t
~'e~reRB1on

I.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Ifemoi ra ~ RaY!lonlf"Poincarf!, II. 135.
Documents D1p1omat1ques Fran~a18 • X, 646. 677.
Memoirs ot-RaYmond . Poincar€. II, 142.
Documents Dip1omatiques ' Fran'jais, X, 64fi. '

-

6

/

charge de me fa1re l'tnterprete aupr~s de lu', le
comte Berchtold m'a yarle avec une sincere ~~9ti o n
de sa longue int1rnite avec l'Archidua defunt.~
'-.

The French attitude In resl'ect tG the

assaBs1nat~

on was

reserved and correct; and when the Austro-Rungar1an Ambassador
came to thank h 1.m for h 1 s condolences, Pres\dent Po'ncart! sa1 d
he was convinced that "the Serbi an Government would show the

,

Monarchy the greatest complaisance 1n the Jud 1 cial investigation
and the prosecut1on of the aCcOml'lices~2
The French, knowing nothing of the events that took l'lace
in Vi enna following the assass1nation, oontinued much as usual.
~n

July 8, Ambassador Dumaine reported that he thought that the

Austr1an rn11itary l'arty would be unable to force upon Serh1 a an
inquiry about tIE orime, and that the Emperor, Franc's Joseph,
3

would prevent any d1 splay of threats. ·

A similar report was
recei ved on July 10, from the same source. 4 Pre sident Po' nc !Ire

wrote concerni ng the sItuation in PaM s:
• • •• In Pari s we suspect noth' ng of. all
this, the Austr1 an Sphinx 1. s impenetrable. In
all thi s mystery 1 could not gjve up my impend1.ng
Journey to the North o~ Europe, for which every
thing had been arranged; moreov.er, a sudden
change of l'lan might h ave suggested ' some impend
ing danger ·a nd might have scared Europe. 5
On the 13th of July, the Prince of Monaco, who hall been on a
~

v'sit to Kiel, stopped to v1s i t the PresIdent at the Elysee
·and to Apeak of the governIng abil i ty of the Kaiser. 6

On

1. Documents D1 plomatiques FranCai s, l, 6'5 4.
2. iemoirs of RaYmond POinoare,:lI, 142.
3. K~oirs i l Ra~nd Polnoar6, II, L56;
of., DQoiiiient~1p1omat1. qU88 Franfais. X, 692.
4. Memoirs ot Ra -nd Pol.ncari, II, 59;
of., DooUiien s
omat! ues Franl8iS, X, 707.
5. Memoirs of Ralmond oincar ,11, 60.

6. Ibid., 160".

...
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,

July 14, France peacefully celebrated her nati o!' al fet e.

l

Dur1ng this time plans for the v1sit to Russia were being made;

•
the Ambassadors corresponded
about the speeches to be made by
.
2
Pres~. dent Poincarll and the' Tear.

:

.

•

1. Vemoi rs of Raymonl· Poinoar~ .. 11, 161.
2.Documents Diplomat3ques Franga~s, X, 706-64.

e

CHAPTER II
,0

POINCARE'S VISIT TO RUSSI!

In order to strengthE'-l1 the Franco-Russian

all~ance,

the
~

Grand Duke N1 cholas N1.cole.i ev1 tch had prevlouely vi s~ ted Par1 s,l
and plans had been made for Presi dent Po<ncare. accompan l ed. by
Prem1erVlviani, to

·Vls~t

st. Petersburg.

Because of delay·

~n

Parliament, they were unable to reach Dunki rk unt i l the 15th of
lhere they embarked on the battlesh< p France,

July.

w~

th the

~ Bart as her companion. 2
Concern'ng the plans for the v' s f t and the lack of records
concerning the conversat<ons which took place 'n St.Petersburg
during t he vl si t of President Poin care and Prem<er Vl vi an~, the
editorsof the Documents liiplomatI9.Ues Fran~a1s sai d in the Avant
Propo s:
'"
/
.
evenemeJ'lt
est la v<site du PreI s tdent
de la Republique, Jl . Poincare, et du Pr'es~. dent du
Conseil, M. Viviani, ~ Salrt-P~tersbourg, du 20 au
23 Juillet. Cette vI site e.vait &ttli prevue des le
mois de Janvi er; mals el1e revetalt, dans lesclr
oonstanoes ou elle se' produisait, une importanoe
toute partiouli~re. La Comrn l ssion e. fait, M.en
entendu, toutes les recherches poss<.bles pour
essayer de retrouver
un compte rendu de ces conver
o"
sationE de Sa<n t -Petersbourg,
dont M. Po i ncare/ a
donne, on le sait, un r~cjt d~tallle dans ses
. souvenIrs. Ces recherches ont ete presque entiere
ment vaines, comme paralssent d'ailleurs l'avoir
et~ oelles qui ont &te faites par les ~dit~urs de
doouments rUBses. Dans les aroh i ves des Mfai.res
~trangeres, ou l'on trouve un dossier sur la
pr~paration de 1a visite. 11 n'ex1ste qu'une seule
note,tr~. b rev e, -de 1a me.tn de M. Vtv1ani, 

L'~utre

•

1. Memoirs of R~mon4 POinoare, I, 253.
2. Ibid., II, 1 .
9

--.

sse se rapporter aux entret~ens. Les
t~legrammes eohan~es entre Sa~nt-PetersbourB et
Paris pendant 1.:a v~ s~te concernent untquel'lent la
politlque ~nter~eure fran9alee. Dans les aroh~ves
de la Pr~s~denoe de la R~publ~~ue, aucnne ~nd~oa
tion n'a ~te retouv~e. Les aroh~ves de l'ambass
ade de Franoe ~ Sa~ nt-P~tersbourg, qu~ ·ont -ete
ramen~!Sa ii. Par; 8, ne donnent auoun n!nse ignement. •
~es efforts qul ont ete faits pour reouell1er dss
pap~. ers pr~v~s ont eu le meme resultat negatl f:
lss paplers o.e M. Po~noar~, tous deposes auJourd'
hui dane les arohlves du Quai d'Orsay. ne oont~en
nent auoune · pi~ce pour cetta per~oc1e; c'est en
valn que la C01"'l'l1 ssion a essaye de trouver (les
pall~ ers de M,Viv~anl, s'll en ex i ste • . , •
}al ~ologue, ambassadeur de France A Sa! nt .- peterfl
bourg, qui a deja publ~' sss souv~nlrs sous forme
de Journal, a fa i t savo'r qU' ~ 1 ne 0 oneerva i t danr
ses papiers personnels aucun dooument
oe suJet.
qui

para~

:.

•

a

Beoause of the silenoe of the Doouments DlplomatIques Fran)a!s
on the

vis~t

elsel!lhere.

to Russia, it has been neoessary to seek information
Nevertheless, such a silenoe makes one wonder I.f It

is :possIble that sOl!le one may have removed part of the fIles b e
fore the

COl!lm~

ssion began Its work.

:t'resldent

Polnoar~

very few notes on the results ot' agreements reaohed by

has made
th~

s vi sIt.

The PresIdent and the Premier of Franoe bad planned to v~slt
RUSSI a in aooordanoe with the cWltom of Franoe Ill1d Russ~. a to ex
change rt'lcl. prooal vIsits since the.v had made their all! ance i.n
1894.

PresIdent Poinoare had p r eviouely vIsIted Russia in 1912,

then as Prem l er. 2
Sinoe preparations for this visit of state had been made so
far in advance ano. events had been planned aocordingly, l.t was
im:possible to llost:pone the visit.

When·it was BUg6.estec). to 101.

Viviani that he postpone the v i sit because of !nternBl happenings
jn Franoe he wrot e. on June

22~

to

~h e

Charg' d r Arf 11.1 re s at St •

•
1. Documents D1plomatiques
2. Ibid., 165.
.

•
Fran<fa~s,

X, vi-vn.

..,
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Petersburg that he had been informed that certain engagements
of the Tsar prev;ented such a change. l

After the

in Sarajevo, Austria' seemed to be rather calm.
was felt that
at

I, f

assass ~ nation

Furthermore, it

Pre S1 dent PoI ncar~ canoelled h~ s voyage to Russia ~'.

that tlme it might tend to aggravate an already grave diplomatJc

..

situation.
M. Sazonov, then the

Russ~an

M1 n 1,ster for

Fore~gn

Affairs,

wrote about the Russian opinion of President Poincarl!.
At the beg'nning of January, 1913, the French
Prime Mintster and Minister for Forel gn Affairs, U.
POincare, was elected President of the French Republic
in succession to M. Fall~~res - a oho1ce WhiCh was
hal led with sat1 stactl on In Russl a. At the suggestlon
of our , AJolbassador in Pari s, M. I svolsky, whl ch recel,ved
my support, the Emperor conferred the Order of st.
Andrew upon the new President as soon as he had taken
up his duties. This was a departure from the usual
custom of granting the hl ghest decoration of the
Emp~re to the head of a State only after he had
occupled the pOSition for SOMe t~me; except~ons were
made only on some spectal oC'caslon, such as a personal
meeting.
M. Polncare's v ' sit to St. Petersburg in 1912,
had left a good 1mpresslon. We apprecIated hls
peaceful d 1 sposltion and hls loyalty to the alllance,
no less than his flrmness and tenaclty of purpose;
this last 1s a quality most valuable J,n a statesman,
even ,when ~t verges on .the corresponding defect
obstinacy. ,
The Russl. ans fel t that

Presid,ent Poinoarll would be pro-Russi an.

The France, oarryl ng Pre s1 dent POl nc are and Prem l er Vlvl anl
arrived at Cronstadt on the afternoon of July 20.

They were

./

escorted by Admiral Gregorov l tch to the ImperIal yacht where
they met Tsar Nlcholas. 3

The two rulers, the Tsar and the

Pres",dent, d1 scussed pleasantly the l r previ oue nieetl ngs, and oon
versed lna lively manner .

Conoern~ng

tha.t di ecusston., Ambaslla

•

:-.,

1. Documentll .Diplomat 1 quell' FrangaJlI, X, S03-4..
2. SazonoT, FatetUl Yearll,149.
3. Yemoirs ot RaYmond POincare, II, 165.

-.
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dor Pal ~ologue, who was also on the yacht at that · time, wrot e:
As was proper 1 t was Pol ncare who haa the
Before long f.!l was ~oing all t.he
talk~ng.
The T$ar simply nodded aoquiesoence,
but hJ s whole appearance showed hi. s sincere
approval. It radl ated oonfl dence ancleympathy.l
in~tlat~ve.'

-.

The GermsnAmbassadoT was un~mpressed by Polncare's arr~val
in

Russ~

a.

Ambassador Pourtales reported, on July 23, that

Pres! dent 1'0incare recejved a "coolreceptl on", but he

attr~

•

but

ed part of the "great apathy of the gel' eral publl c" to the work
ingmen's str~kes, wh~ch, in addltlon to ot.her lnconveniences,
prevented some .of the newspapers from being publi shed. 2

On the

following day he again reported to Berlin:
• • • • For the arrl val of the Pre s~ dent and
for hi s passage along the Neva Quay to the W~nter
Palace, but a oomparatively small proportion of the
phhli 0 gad gathered, wh~ ch not only faUed to gj ve V.l'.
Polncare an ovation, but, indeed scarcely greeted him.
The streets -. (lecorated by pol~ ce orders, but 1 n no
wfIY part~ cularly thl. ckly beflagged - through wh~ ch the
Presldent w~th hls escort and a numerous su'te passed
on a dr~ve about the c~ty during the afternoon, were
far from being unusually l~vely, and only at the streAt
corners d~d a few curious s~ght-seers gather to await
the passing of the cort~ge.
On July 20, the Tsar gave
from France.

a banquet

in honor of

h~

s guests

At this banquet the Tsar and Pres~de!1t POir;care

made speeche s concernl ng the all ~ anoe and .trl el'dshl p of the two
countries.4

These same speeches hacl b'len the subjAct of several

tel egrams between Premi er

v~ v~anl

and Ambassacl,91' ]?al-eologue 1 n

st. Petersburg durlng the early part of July.

The Doouments Dlplo

mati ques Franpaie give the 1'ull text of President Polncare's speech,
but onll the suggested

modif~

cati ons 1'or the Tear's SIl;,ech,

wh~

1. P81eologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, 13.

2 • Kaut sky, ClutliTeak _f the World War, 168.
3. Ibid., 211.
- --
4. Pal flologue , An Ambassador's l~emoirs, I, 14.

'"
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ch

were accepted by
the

d~. nner

}I.

Sazonov.l

In this Manner the stage for

was set. so that the speeches would he accaptable

to both of the count;rl.es concerned.
speech

~s g~ven

H~stortoal
~ng

in the

publ~cation

lournal of ·the

Russ~an

The text of the Tsar'·s
of the 1"923 volume of the

Sovl.et Government.

Concern

the alltance, the Tsar sajd:
• • • . Uri~ted s'nce .long ago by the mutual
sympathy of thp.'r peoples and the~ r common
~nterests, France and Russ'a have reen closely
bound together dur~ng nearly a quartp.r of a
century w'th the object of better pursu~ ng one
. and the same aim, wh'ch cons'sts ~n ma1ntaln~ng
these inte:r:-ests by co-operat~.ng 1n the preserva
t~on of the balance amI the peace of Europe.
I
do not doubt that both of our countrIes, true to
the'r peaceful ~deals and relyIng upon the!r
proved all! ance as also upon the'r oommon frlend
" hips, wHl cont!.l'ue to enjoy the henefits of the
reaoe wh! ch the f'ullness of the! r strength ensures
by constant y tyIng more tightly the bands wMch
unj te them.
. .

•

2

In

Pres~dent Po~ncare's

sjJeech weTe the follow1ng statements:

"Pres de vlngt-cing 8l".s ont passe depu; s que,
dans une cla're v' sIon v.e leur destin, nos pays
Ol't un' les efforts de leur d~plQmatje. et les
heureux r~sultats · de cette assoc~ atl on peI'l!la
nente se font taus les jours sent ' r oans l'equ~llbre
. du monde.
n • • • • 1' alliance, dont l' ~ llUfltre Empereur
Alexandre III et leregrett~ Pres; dent Carnot ont
pr's la premlere 1n't'at<ve, a constamment donne',
depu~ s lors, la preuve de son action b'enfa~ sante
'!t. (Ie son 'rebranlable soUdj te.
"Yotre raj este pent etre assuree que, deJT1a1 n
comme hler, la France poursu'vra dans une collabo
ration Intime et quotld1 enne avec son alli-ee
l'oeuvre de pajx et de c'v~l'sation
lequelle
les deux Gouvernements et les deux nat~ons
n'ont cess~ de travalller •. ' . ' .n3

a

/'

.

~

According to Ambassador Paleologue, . the Pres1dent's speech

1. Doouments l)jplomatl.ques Franva1. '" X, 706-S".
2. How the War Bigan 113.
3. D<iOumentSDiP OJlla~qUe8 Fran".'''.' X, '155.

..
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was well rec~ived.

AfterwarQs the Tsar held a lev~e at whIch

everyone seemed' ,anx:\ous to meet Presldent po~ncar~.l
•

Another tmportant event durIng the Pres l dent's VI 51 t to st.
Pet ersburg was the d! plomati c receptlon gi yen 1 n h;, s honor at
the Wlnter l:'alace on the afternoon of July 21.

There he spoke

to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, hut the
poll t~ cs was not ment1oned. 2

Dur~ng

su~ject

of'

thl8 1ntervlew occurred

the dJscussion between Pree~dent Po~ncare and Count Szapary, the
Austri an AMbassador.:3

Pres1dent Po!ncare expressed to Count

Szapary Ms sympathles in regard to the assass~nation In Sara
Jevo; then he inqulred about

Austro-Serh~an

relations.

In reply

to the question about what demands would r-e made of Serh i a, Count
Szapary replied that he was not informed about the Inquiry which
was still in progress.

Count Szapary seems to have just return

ed to St. Petersburg unexpectedly after
wife and son in
what

V~

enna.

Austr~a-Rungary

hav~ng

v's;ted

h~s

lnval~d

Probably he had had verbal notl ce of

planned to do and had returned to st. Peters

burg only to play his part In trying to keep the Russian9 and
thel r French '1'1 sHers from suspectIng Austria's next move in the
Serbi!1ll 01"1 sl s.4

The interv1 'ew was further described 1n Count

szap'i!ry's report.

So far there was no off< cJ al not! ce

g1

ven 1 n

the Austrian Red Book.
Yons<eur POincar6 then del<vered a klnd of
l .e cture, using all h1 s orat.or1 cal powers and
ex.l)la'.ned that to make a government re spons! ble
~or a!l1thIng was only admissable when there were
oo:t1orets proofs against it., otherwi se a demarohe

1. Pa1~01ogue, ~ ~~assador1e Memoirs, I, 14-~.
2. I bid., 1'1.
3. Reports of the conversation may be found l,n Memoirs of
RaYmond PoJ.ncare, Ir, 1'10-1; Kautsky, Outbreak of the War, 170;
Austrl.an Red Book, I, 98-9; Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memo! rs,
I, 17-19.--- ----
4. Paleologue, An Ambsssat'.or's Memoirs, I, 18. ~'
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of th~. s k1 nd would be a mere pretext, and th~ s
he could not suppo~e Austr 1 a-Hungary to be
gu~lty of, in the case of BUch a small country.
At any rate one ,must not forgFlt that Serv~ a has
fr1 ends and that a sttuatton might be created,
wh1ch mtght become dangerous to peace. Ioonf!ned
myself to a qui et and precl se answer, remarking
that up to a certain degree every government 1 s
responslble for everythlng that happens on !ts
territory. The president sought to refute th!. s
thesjs by constltutlng analogous cases between
other stateR, so that I could not but say that·
all depended upon circumstances and that analogi es
and generalisations dld not serve. In the course
of the conversation, Monsleur Po!ncar~ made a
concealed allusion to the alleged "Prohaska
case" to which I made a f!.tting reply.
lie closed the conversat1on by express~ne
the wl sh that the result s of the ~ nqu~ ry !'light
be such as not to give cause for ~~squlet.

•

Count Szapary felt that M. Spalajkovlc, the Serh 1 an Minister,
might have had somethJ.ng to do w!th the President's wordSj2

"
that Pre s~ dent Po1nc are's
/
Count Pourtales
bali ev~
word s were
"nstlgated by M. Sazo.nov, "who is tr;ring out a pol~cy of hluff".3
Both

A~bassadors

considered it very poor taste for the head of

a state who was v!

s~t1ng

threatening" attitude. 4

in a forei gn land to take

"9Jl

almost

No m~ntlon is made of this in the Br!tlsh

Documents.
Because he was pressed for time, Presldent Poincare merely
shook hands with the rn!nisters of the smaller stateR.
ed a few words of S3mpathy to M. Spalajkov 1 c.
/

He express

Then he left,

~th

.

Y. Ps!eologue, and went to an enterta!nment be 1.ng given for the

off!cers of the French squadron by the St. Petersburg Dema. 5
On the following day President Po!ncar~ rev!ewed a parade
of the Russian troops in which IIl.xty thousand men took part.&

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Austr1 an Red Book,", 98.
Ibid •• 98:--~ .
Kautsky, Out'breakof the World War, 170.
Austrian Red Book,:r,~.
--
Pal~ologue:-~bassador's Memoirs, I, 19-20.
I Md., 23. -

-
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Pre sl. dent Poino

are,

wM le on hi s Russi an Vi s1 t, h ad the

objective of using his influence to bring about more friendly
,

relations between England and

Russ~a,

who weTS not then on good

terms in respeot to the situation in Persia.

This had been

suggested by M. Pal~ologue to Sir George Buchanan, the Brttl.sh
Ambassador, who reported it to the Brltish Government on July i. 1
President Poincare helped to bring about a better understaflding
between Russia and England

o~

this question, and after he had

returned to Par! s the British Ambassador there oongratulated h'm
for Sir Edward Grey on the suooess of his v i sit. 2

In addition

to the English affair, there was also a misunderstand!ng between
Russia and Sweden.

RUssia felt that Sweden was rearming unjustifl

ably, and Sweden had grievanoes about Russian esplonage. 3
return trip President POinoarifl, during his

On his

stop at Stockholm,

carr! ed a reassuring me ssage from the Tsar to the Ki.ng of Sweden. 4
D'lring President Poincare's visit, a communiqUe was given
to the press.

This was prepared by Ambassador

order of and approved by Prem; er Viviani.

Pal~ologue

at the

The text follows.

"The vis1t whioh the President of the Republ'o
has just paid to H. X. the Emperor of Russi a has gl ven
the two .friendly and allied governments an opportunity
of di scovering that they are ; n ent~ re agreementi n
their views on the various pToblems WhiCh oonOern for
peaoe and the balanoe of power in ~lrope has laid
before the Powers, part i oularly j n the East."5
An agreement reaohed by the Russi an and French Governments was
reported by Sir Georg-e Buohanan, the

Brit~8h

Ambassador in st.

Petersburg, who at a-ted tha.t .Y. Sazonovand Y. PaH!ologue told him
oonfidenti ally tbat thq had come to an understanding on the follow

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

British DooUlllents, n, 39, 61.
Ibi d ., XI, ZOO.
Memoirs of R~mond Poincare, II, 165-6.
]fciOumentslliI(omati. ques FranjaiB, x, 725.
:pal~ologue, Al1 Ambassador's ~emoirs, 1,25.

~
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1ng points:
1. Pel'feot 00l!l1!!Ul'l1 ty of v1 ews on the var~. ous
problel!ls with Whi.oh .tb!·Powers are conf.ronted as
regards the maintenanoe of general peaoe and balance
of power in Europe, more espeoially in the East.
2. Decision to take acUon at Vienna with a view
to thepreventi on of a demand for expl ana tl ons or any
SUl!ll!lons equ!valent to an Intervention in the i.nternal
affairs of. Serbia, wM oh the latter would 'h" Just; ned
j n regardi nB as an attaok on he r sovere! gnty and
independence.
3. Solemn aff!rrr,at!on of obli~at:lons tl'lposeo by
the alli ance of the two countrI es .
.
On the 23rd of July, President

P01noar~

and Prel!l'er

~

V~vian!

concluded their Russian visit and embarked on the Franoe, at Cron
stadt. 2

After Ambassador Pal~ologue had said. farewell to h; s chi efs,

he returned with the Tsar on the Impertal yaoht to st. Petersburg.
The Tsar made me sit beMnd h:!m in . the stern
of the yacht and told me of the conversat1on he had
just ~ad with Poincare:
"I'm del:!ghtedv,lth my talk with tb!President.
We see absolutely eye to eye. ::: am not less peaoe
loving than he, · and he \8 not less determined thgn I
to do everythingneoessary to prevent the cause of
peace be:!ng compromised. He fears sorne Austro
German manoeuvre agalnst SerbJa ard th:!nks we !'huuld
reply with the united front of a cornmon d:!.plomatic
policy. · 1 think the same. We must show ourselves
firm and united in our efforts to find possible
solutions and the necessary adjustments. The more
d; ffl cult the iii tuati on bee omes the more 1 mp.o!'t ant
will unity and firmness become."3
While President Po:!ncar~ and Prem:! er Vivian:!. were on their
return trip aboard the 'France, thei r wi rele 8S reoepti on was
generally bad. 4

'"

As it was proved later, these cO!!ll!lunioat:lons

had been interfered with by the creation of disturbanclls as
ordered

~y

the German Government.

Prem:!er Viviani cited orders

found in the German w.ireleslI8tation at lIetz t hat French wireless

1.Br1ti Bh Dooument 8~ XI, 80.
2. Memoirs of RaYmond Poincare, II, 80.
3. Pal~ologUe, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, 27.
4. Memoi rtl otRs,ymond Po; ncare , 11, 182.

...

,
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~rn~unications

belng

se~t

to the France, to Russ! a, gnd to

Dunkirk were to he d'stl1J:'r~d.l

This was ~one of course to pre

vent act ion by the French Government, who se PreB1 d~nt and Prem! er
were then on board the France, after the ultima'tum had been given
to SerM. a by the Austri an Mini ster, Gi e sl, when Prest'dent Po1 nc are
was 1 eav1.ng RUSSi a' on July 23.
On the way to France, the President and the Prem1er made a
short stop in Stoci:holm where they del 1 vered the Tsar's

..

~ellsage

to

the K\ng of Sweden and learned of the ultlmatum which had ju s t been
sent to Serbia. 2 As they oont1nued on the 1 r homeward voyage, Presl
dent Poinc ar~ and Preml er Vi vi. ani reoel ved a telegram wri tten on
July 26 by M. Bienvenu-Martin, the Acting Hinl ster of Forelgn Affairs
In Paris.

Thl.s telegram advlsed the two chiefs of State to come

home immed.iately in order that they might more easily direct the
affa! rs of France 1 n the interr atl onal or1 s; s. 3

On July 27, Prem1 er

V1vlani sent a message to the French Ministers at Copenhagen

am

Chr i stianl a telling them to not! fy the rulers of Denmark and Forway

,

.

that, due to the unsettled fore1gn affalrs, Pres 1 dent Poincare and
M s entourage woul d oancel the'r v1 sl ts

would return to France l.mmed1ately.4

1n

th ose countri es and

While stlll aboard the France

Frem' er V v i an , on July 28, sent wor1!. to X. Bienvenu-l-!artin to
'
'
prepare for them on the i r 9I'rival at Dunkirk, on the following day,
a dossier about the .lustro-SerMan oonflict. 5 The p~ople were 'glad
when the i r leaders returned to d i reot the i r cO'llI'try's part In the
fast movIng diplomatio soene.

1 . Viv1.an!, As We Site It, 96-'1.
2. Memoirs orR:f'mOiidPoinoarl!, II, 186.
3. Documents Dip omatt§ues Fran~a1
II, 81.
4.

Ibid., 109.

.t

5. Ibid., 163.
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CRAPTER III
•

-.

THE TILTI YATUY TO SERBI A

The assassination of the heir-apparent to ihe Austro-Runaer
ian throne by the young

Boen~an.

was 1nvestlgated by the Austri.an

Princip. an Austrian subject,
authorit~es.

It was proved that

the · assassins had secured the1r arms from Serb1a, but 1t could not
be proved that the Serb'on .Governmel".t had had any part 11". the plot.
In fact, Councillor Wiesner, the Austrian

~nvest~gator,

reported

on Jul!' 13;
"The complicity of the Serblan Government 8S
to the assaee:l.nati on and as to preparatton and
. del~very of weapons, rests on no evi dence, and can
not even be presumed, n.ay more, there 1 s good reason
for cons 1 dering .i t ~rnpoea1ble."l
The

assass~nation

of the ArGhduke Franc 1 s Ferd 1 nand. was not

the real caUse of the iVorld War; 1 t was the occasi

OI'.

for the War.

Pres1dent Polncar~ hae written that 1t was merely the pretext where
by

!I

out. 2

previously planned expedH10n to crush

Serr~ Ii

1'11.ght be carr! ed

He cont~nued;
The CC'unc~l (Austr1an) wrote 1n 1ts m1 nutes,
"CIa! ms so drastl c are likely to preface a refusal
and w1 11 allow us to arrive at a fin~ solution
by means of a mH1.tary ~nterventi on."
Un the 14th of July, Count BerchtoH., the .Austrt an Mj nister

for Foreign Affairs, tried at the Crown Council to secure agree

1. llem01 reof RaYmond POi nOIll'i!. II, 14S.
2. Ibid •.• 1:m-9.
3. Ib14 ... 115'7.
II>

-
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ment to the ultimatum wh1ch was to be sent to Serr 1 a.
the Rungar1an

represertat~ve

held out aga 1 nst

h~m

Tisza,

tmt!l July 15,

since he feared that.Huss; a might support Serbi.a and was opposed
to war because of the r1sk that Hungary would run.

Then Count

Berchtold sent the ulti matu.l'l to Emperor Franc; Bt Joseph for
approval.

before President
fact ;

8

s

l
Austr~ans

The

h~

had planned to send

Po~ncare

~he ult~matum

could leave France for

to Serb 1 a

Russ~a.

•

Th~s

shown in the report of Al'1bassaoor Tschirschky, t h e Gerrran

Ambassador at

V, enna,

on July 13. 2

'But Pres 1 dent Poincare left

French soll on July 16, and agreement ab out tbe sencJ 1 ng of the
ul t! matum was not secnred unt11 July 15.

Rence tM s plan could

not be followed because the Austr1 ans w{ shed to prevent co mlllon
action by France and Russ 1 a to help SerM a.
On July 14, Count Berchtold reported that the l'1 elllb ers of the
Crown Council had agreed that 1t would be best n ot to Aend the
ult1matum unt 1.1 after Pres 1 dent Po1ncare would have cOlllpleted h! s
vi s! t !.n Eusei,a.

The Austr-i an Forei gn Mi n~ ster felt th at

ul t~. matum were sent durl,ng that

vj s~

! f the .

t, France m! ght be " affronted" •

He wrote:
. . . . Overmore, if the amblt10us Pres 1 dent of
the R e publ~ c was to di scuss personally t h e new s! tua
t~on c r eated by the ult~, matum with the Czar, there ~ s
more probab 111ty than otherwise, that France and Russ 1 a
may interfere. 3
To Count Szogyeny, his AmbassRdor 1n Berl!n, Count Berchtold wrote
on the following day:
• • • • Bes1des, we should con81de~ } t unwiee
threaten~, JIg step in Belgrade at

to undertake t 'he

.

-

1. Memoirs ot R~ond Polncare, II, 161
2. Kautsky,outnJ of the World War, 101.
'3. Austrian Red Bock, I .~.

----
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the very t! me when the pf'!acelov! ng, reserved Emperor
R'cholas and unden 1 ably caut 1 0uS Herr Sazonow. are
un(ler the 1.nflue·nce of the Il1'o, who are alwayE' for
war. I swol'sky an (1. POinoare•
•

Ambassador T soh~ rsohky reported the same dec i s~. on to hi s Govern
ment in Bf'!rlin .. .

-,.

."

~

• • • • For ' t was best to av01d 1f poss1ble the
celebration of a f~etern~zation at Petersburg, under
the l nfluence of champagne and. of Messrs. Po!. ncar~,
lswolski and the Grand Dukes, wh10h might have an
effect on the assufTJptton 811(1. possl.ole flJst 1 0n of
an attitude on the part of both nat1ons.

•

In thi s last quot ati on ! s shown the true reason for the
delay of the ultimatum until after President Poincare's
departure from Russia - the Austr1ans

d~a

n ot

w~sh

to have

their ultimatum delivered at a time when the heads of the
states of Franoe and RUSSi a were together and when concerted
aotion by those two powers was possible, because' such action
might favor Serbia and hinder Austrla in her plans.

Concern 1 ng

thi. S Prof. B. E. SchmHt has written that 1t was natural for
Count Berohtold to delay sending the ul'tlmatum whHe the Tsar
and hi s state smen were influenced by the two
car~

"j

ncI ters", P01 n-

and lsvolsky, in order to take the French and Russian Govern

ment s at a d i .sadvantage, but by such . acti on the Austri an 111 n1 ster
3
would oertainly "incite" them.
The Austr! an ofn c 1 als. after h avi.ng dec 1 0ed to t1.me the
se1Jdtng of their ultimatum to Serb 1 a so that !i could not
possibly oecome known in st. Petersburg until atter Presldent
I'oinoare's departure, ·had the problem of ascerta 1ning the
exaot time of h1 a departure.

The German Govenment through



1. Auat rian Red 1I0 0~ I, 49.
2. Kautaky, 'Q,it"breu of the World War, 113-4.
3. Sohm1 tt, Coming of the War, I,

m.
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Von Jagow, the Becretary of the Forelgn Office, secured this
~ nformat1on for,Count Berchtold. l

received the report

On July 21, ~on Jagow

~hat

the Presldent's departure from st.
Petersburg would be at 10:00 P.M., July 23. 2 On July 22,

..

Count Pourt al~s, the German Ambassac1.or l n St. Peterl"burg, r!'!port
ed to Von Jagow that 1t would be at eleven o'clock. 3
Von Jagow comrnun1cated to Count Berchtold through

This report

•

Amb~ssador

Tsch~rschky at Vienna. 4

On

rece ~ v1ng

tM s news Count Berchtold hurriedly sent a

message to Baron von Giesl, thf'! Austrian Minister In Belgrade,
Serb1a, who had the ultimatum which he was t o deliver at the
previously appointed time, to delay the

ult i ~atum

for an hour.

This message was sent to Baron von Glesl late on July 23.
If you can possibly arrange matters, postpone
the demarche to six o'clock, in whl ch Case the term
of the answer must also be cha~~ed to s~x.
I add for your information that we wi Rh, if l.t
were at all possible, to prevent the news of the de
marche from reaching Petersburg th i s evening, because
Pre si dent Poi ncare r e1'lains there unt I l eleven o'clock
to-night.1>
CoUIit Berchtold, on that same day, sent Count Szec sen,
the Austri an Ambassador in Paris, the excuse which was to be
present~d

to the Frel".ch when they woUld

not~. ce

the coinc1 dence

of t i me of the two events.

.

As to the coincldenCe of the demarche in Belgracle
wl th the departure of POi ncare from Petersburg, it is
to be remarked that we alw!I,Ys meant to take the demarche

1.

2.
3.
••
6.

Outbre ak !!. the -World~, 145.
Ibid., 1:41 .

Ibid., 153 •
Ibid., 155.
Austr! an fu!! Book• .1. ll2.

Kaut~,

'.
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as soon
cl uded.
At

s~ x

the i nqu-l ry i!l Saraj evo h!l.d been con
T1;I1 s has si nce been the case. l

f'. S

o'clock "in the afternoon of July 23, Baron von

G~ esl del j vered the ultimatum to the SerM an GoveI'l1ment. 2
d ocument stated

t~~t

the

Au stro-Hungar~an

that the Serbian GoveI'l1ment had ' violated

GoveI'l1ment
~ts

Thi s

con~'dered

declaration of 1909

•

to accept Austrian annexa't i on of Bosnia and to be a fr1 endly
ne1.ghbor to Austria-Hungary.
II.

EUbverslve

rnove~ent

It accused SerM a of having

perm~_ tted.

whJ ch had the object of detaching a part of

the Austro-Hnngarl an terM tor l es; the assass l nation l.n Sarajevo
was cjted as

ev~dence.

The ultimatum stated that the

Austr~

an

inquiry had proved that the - assasel ·ns had been armed ani' tra'ned
to use those arms by certain

Serb~an

officers ·and had been perm'tt

ed by SerM an front 1. er off1cj als to cross the border' nto
and there to kill the Archduke on Austrian terr' tory.
was d'ctatAd for

Serb~a

to make.

Bosn~

a

An apology

In order that Austria-Hungary

might be assured afSerbla's inte!ltions, ten demands were made of
SerMa. 3
The Roy al Serbian Government further npdertakes:
1. To suppre es any pUb1 ' c at ion wM_ch inc1 te s to
hatred and contempt of the Austro-Rungarlan Monardby
and the general tendenoy of wh1 ch ~ s d'rected agal net
!.ts terr'torial -IntegrHy~
2 . To di ssolve immediately the soc'-etl" styled
Narodna Odbrana, to confi scate all 1 ts l!Je'ans of
propaganda • • . .;
3. To ellminate w'.thout delay from public In
struction in Serbla • . • everything that serves, or
might serve, to foment the propaganda ag8i~st Austr!a

.'

1. Austrian Red Book, I. 10".
2. Documents DipIOiiiitI 9.Ues Fra ga' 8, XI. 2, 4-9 .
3. Austrian R~ !ook. It 58-63 •
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...,

H\mgary;
4. To remo'Ve from the l'l111tary serv~ce, sn<l.
from th e admj n1 strati on t n gemeral, all off~ cers
and functlonaries gu11ty of propaganda agatnst
the Austro-Hungarlan Monarohy whose names and
deeds the Au stro-hungar1an Ronarchy reserves to
j tself the r~ght of commun~ catIng to th"! RpY,al
Government;
5. To accept the collaborat 1 0n j n SerM"a of
representat1ves of the Austro-Hungarl an Gov~rn
ment for the suppression of the subvers~ve move
I'!ent dl rected aga1 nst the terri t o~ al 1 Yltegr1 ty
of the Monarcr.y;
6. To take Judlc1al proceed 1ngs aga1nst
acoessort es to the plot of 28 June who are on
S'!rb~ an terr'tory; delegates of the Austro-hungar
1 an Government wHl take part tn the 1nvest 1 gat10n
relating thereto;
7. To proceed • • • to the arrest of Major
Voya T an)co III ch and of • • . M11an TSi ganov~ ch • • •
who have been comprom ; sed by the result s of the
magi sterlal inqu~ ry at Saraj evo;
' 8. To prevent • . • the cooperation of the
Serbian authorities in the illlC1.t traff 1 c in
arms and explosives across the frontl.er, to dt s
mlss and pun 1 eh severely the.off~c1als on the
fl'ontler serv1ce • • • gu11ty of having ass' sted
the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crlme by facil~
tating thel r passage across the froYlt~ er;
9. To furn 1 sh the I mperi al and Royal Govern
ment wlth explanations regardIng the unjusttfl.able
utterances of h1gh Serbian off1c i 81s • • • who have
not hesl tated since the cr1me of 28 June to express
themselves in terms of host~lity to the Austro
Hungarian Government; and, finally,
10. To not1fy the Imperial and Royal Govern
ment wIthout delay of the exeoution £1' the measures
compri sed under the preceding he.a ds. .
.
The ultimatum

~

requ~

red a reply in forty-eIght hours, that 1. 8, by
.
2
slx o'clock on Satul'day evenlng, July 25.
Before the ultimatum had been ser.t AMbaAsador Tsch~ rschky

had urged moderation on Austrl.a, but
to the Kaiser. 3

hj

s actlon was iU spleaslng

Fresl.dent Poincare said t.hat in Far1s noth1~g

1. Auetri an Red Book, I, 58-60.
2 . Ibid., 63: : - 

3. Memo:! rs OfR~Ond~O~ncare, II, l5l;
Kaut'SkY~utbreak .01' the World ~, 6l •

or.,

..
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.'

was known of these actions being taken !n V1 enna and BerliI!.l
But Germany knew, on, July 5 when Count Hoyos went to see the
Kai ser at Potl"dam, that some strong representation would be
made by Austr:i a-Hungary to SerM a.

At th at t1 me the Kai ser

prom~ R~d to support Austria, even if RUBS! a should enter the _ar. 2

,

The Kautaky Documents do not mention such a promise.
After Serbl a had rece;ved the ul tirnatum she appeale" to
the Great Powers for help and allv; ceo

M. Sazonov

adv~

sed SerM a

.to seek Brltish med i at1on3 and not to ente.r hostillties with
!ustria-Hungary.4

He had the Russ1an Ambassap. o,r at V;enna re

quest COU11t Eerchtold to
ultimatum. 5

g~ve

Serb! a more time to answer the

England made a slmtlar demarche lit VlenJ'la. 6

The Serb i an reply was deli vered by M.· Pas~.e to Baron von
Glesl only a few .m;nutes before the exp;ratior of· the time Hmit
on the 25th of July.

The reply was moderate in tone in contrast

to the Austri an demands.

The Serb; ans den! ed havtng fai led to

observe the de.claration of March 31, 1909.

The note took up the

Austrian demand s one at a ti 1'le •. Some were accept ed, but each
acceptance was accompani ed by certain reservati ·ons.

The

f~

fth

point - aceepttng collaboration of such agent s in suppressing
the "subversive movement" - was accepted by Serbia only in so far
as it was compati ble wi th the ' "pri nci pl es of i nt ernat! onal law
and the frlendly relations of a neighbor state".

The

s~xth

1 . Memoirs ot R!lmonll' o 1m: ar~.• II. 156,
2. Ibid •• l.!!.
.
3 . Document. D!plolllat1.g.ue. Frangal. s, n, 68.
, . Kemahs of R ' mond Poin.car' " 11 , 183.
5. DocumenteD! oma
ues Franyalll, n, 42.
6. llemairs of aYmond Po!ncar#l, II, 18'1;
cf., British Documents, XI, 73-4.
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point of the ultimatum

W'1!l

rejected - that of partl.o' pation of

Austro-n\lTIgarians in the in<J.uiry ' .nto the Sarajevo orl.me.

SerM a

stated that if thi s reply were unsatl afactory, Bhe was ready

..

to accept "a paclfic unclerstlinding"; and suggested
submitting the
.
entire matter to the Ir.ternational Tribunal at The Hague.

The

Serbians sai d that It would be log; c!ll to entrust the whole effal r
to the Great Powers who had ha~ a share l.n the Declaration of 1~09.1
ConceI'1" i ng al\v i ce f or the Serbian reply Professor SChl!litt has
wrl tten:
1 f the Belgrade CaM net recel vee. from it s
European frj.ends spec1 fi cadvice (we have seen
that the Entente Powers urged moderation and
conciliation) for the red90tion of lts reply.
the fact j s not known. The hypothesi B that
M. Berthelot of the French forel gn office pro
v i deo. the draft of an anBwer'2while it may be
correct, has not been proved.

The

Document~

Diplomati ques

Fran~ai

s 0.0 not menti on any draft

by M. Berthelot, thereby upholding ProfesBor Schm1tt's statement
quoted above.
President Poi.ncare wrote that neither the Ka! ser Tor Ms
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, when they saw the Serbian reply.
could help thinking that Austria had r~ceived satisfaction.:;

:Rut

Austri a-Hungary was determined to solve the SerMan quesHon at
that time for her own safety, ar.d Paron von Gleel, her Arnbassa
dor, left Belgrade 1mmeo. i.ately after glancl.ng through the reply
to see that the ultimatum had not been accepted in its entirety
as stipulated in his l.nstTUctions. 4

Two .hours after answe~. ng

the ultimatum,Serbia, .knowing that war would follow, ordered
lIob1li·zati Oll and moved ~e r capital to

IfV •• 5

1. Austrt :8.n Red :Sook,-rl, 160-70. 40-~8.
2. Schmi tt, CO'iiiingof the War, I, 531-2.
3. Memoirs of Raymond POincare, II., 199;
cf., Kautsky, Outbre/lk of the World War, 2M.
4. Documents Diplomatiques Fran9a1s, n:-&'7.
5. Austrian Red Book, II, 23.

..,
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On the 29th of July, M. VesnHch, the Serbisn
ap;?esled to France for help in
81'.1 pment of

art~

}!~. n~ster,

th~

s cr' s j s, by requesti.ng a
1
llery, and for ored1.t.

After Russ'. a had spoken of her sympathy for Serb! a, Austr-! a- -
Hungary, on July 26, declared to Russl a that she,

Austr~

a-Hungary,

had no intention of sep.k1ng territorial aggrandizement nor of'
limiting the integri.ty of Serbia.
to assu:!"e her own

tranqu~llity.

Austr~

a-Hungary wanted merely

It was felt, by the Central

Powers, that whether or not war could be avoided would depend
on Russia'sdec'slon. 2

But Austr'a-Hungary planned to d'vlde
Serbian terrltory among her ne1ghbors when conquered. 3
By July 28, Austria-Hungary began mobilization agalnst

Serb:!a and announced in ParIs that she would, on the next day,
.
4
take energetl c measures to have sat'-sfacti on ~alnst Serb~. a.
On the 28th of July, Austrl a-Hungary de clared war agal n at

Serbia. 5

1. Doouments Diplomatl queaP'ran!fala, XI, 205.
2. Documents D~p1olDatJqueS Frania< a, ~, 73;
of., .Auatri an Red liook. II, ~. II.!.. 53.
3. Kemoira of RaYmond P oinoare. II. 213;
of " .Au arr1 an Red Book. I II, 54. .
.
',Dooumsnts Dip1omatf'ijUi8 FranlFals. I I . 158-9 .

5, Ibid •• 1 8 5 . ·
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CHAPTER IV

-.
EFFORTS FOR PEACE
~

The rapid developments follow1 ng the Austro-Hungar1'an
ultimatum to Serb 1 a were lead 1 ng Europe toward a general war.
Germ8J'lY nppe ared

ma~

nly 1nt ere st ed

1

n

k()'9p~

ng the re st of Europe

neutral while her ally, Austria-Hungary, settled the quarrel
with Serbia to her own satisfaction.

IllU'lediately after Austrl a-

Hungary had sent the ultimatum to Serbia,

Russ~a

she would not abandon the Slavs 1n the Balkans. l

deolared that
Thereupon

Ge r many urged that the confU. ct be "localized", unless the other
Powers

W1

shed to bring about "1.ncalc1,1la'l:>le consequences".2

But while many events were leading toward a general European
war, defin 1 te efforts were being made to keep peace.
reall. zed that
burg

1

1. t

Germany

woul d be · neoe s8ary to t 'a ke acti on at St. Peters

f she w:' shed to prevent' the extensl on of the c'on1l1 at to

the rest of Europe.

For that reason, 'Baron von Schoen, the Germ8J'l

Ambassador at Paris· suggested on July 26 to M. Bl envenu-Marttn
that the 1 r two countrl es should seek to pacIfy Russ 1 a
Hungary would declare that she favored
territory.

I'lO

1

f Austr1 a

annexatl.on of Serbi 8J'l

M. Bienvenu-Martin, the acting French

1v!1n~ster

for

Foroei61lAffa1rs, sl\~d,that th 1 s would 'he pOlIslble only if simHar
.tepa weros takeJ:l. atV1enna .
dor ,,011 Sch on.

!'hi s oond~t' on was roefused 'I!y Ambassa

1I. :B1 ellTenu;';1Iart1n tel t that thl s was an effort

1. Collected D1 pI omat1. c Documents, 269.
2. Documents Diplomatiques Fran9a1s, n, 19.

-.

to sh1ft the bla~e for a conf11ct on to Russ 1 a.

l

Also on July 26,England proposed a Four-Power Conference
to be attended by th-e Great Powers not direotly interested in
the Austro-Serbian affa 1 r and its imp11 cati 'o ns for ,
ly, England,France, Germany, and Italy.2
in Pari s asked wh ether France would

~

RUS8 1

a - name

The Brit~, Bh Ambassador

nstruot the Frenoh Amb a '!I sail or
~

1n London to represent FrRnce at such a conference; he fUrther
stated that he :understood that the German Government probably
3
would accept the suggest10n.
The French Government on the
follow1ng day gave a note to S1r Franc 1 s 'Bert1 e, the EngU sh Am
a\\thor~zi.ng

bassador,

A!,)bassacl.or Paul Cambon to aot 1n th at
1ty at the proposed conference. 4

cap~,c-

Meanwh;le BerUn failed to accept the British suggesti on by
the 28t11 of July on wh 1,ch day Austria had CleClded to 1!I0MHze. 5
On the 29th of July, the Brlt 1 8h Embassy 1n Par 1 s ;ssued a note
reporting that Germany faIled on July 27' to accept the, Br1 t1 8h
suggestioJ'1

'!)ecau~

suoh a Conference would amount to a "Court

of Ar'hl tnaM on" which could be calletl only at the request of
Austr1 a and Russ'l, a. 6

Sir Edward Goschen objected to ,th's 1nter

pretation of the Conferenoe proposal, but Von Jagow refused to
change h 1 a op1n10n.

Von Jagow also stated that he had Just

been informed that M. Sazonov end Count Berchtold lntended to
exchant>;e

V1

ewe dJ rectly. and that all other

med~

must awa1 t the outoome of those converaat1 ons. 7

a tory influence a
Sl r lI;dward Grey

1. Kautsky,Outbreak of the World War. , 209, 229, 233.
2. British Dooumenta,-n:-To1:
-
ct., Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1. 315.
a. Dooument!! Diplomati1ues Franqa111 , n. 91-2 .

4. Ibid., 135.

'

•

5. Ibid., Ui8-9.
6. Ibid •• 236-7.
7. I b1. d ., 230 - 7 •
~
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,..

next asked Germany to suggest a plan to prevent war. l
On the

aft~rnoon

intervtew wt th Count

of the 26th of July, M. Sazonov had an
Sz~pe:ry

was unwilling to settle
to Count Berchtold.
ti ons w1. th

V~

th~

in St. Fetersburg, but the latter
con~oversy

without first talking

M. Sazonov tI1 ed to inst1 tute dl rect negotl a-

enna, but the Austro-RungaI1 an GoverlU!lent sa 1 d that
~

1t was tmposs1ble to 0.1 scuse the Serbian reply bllcause Vl enna h'lt1
2
already oeclared that reply to be lnaccepta'Jle.
On July 28,
Ambassador Paleologue secured from M. Sazonov a proml se to accept
all the peace proposals that would he made by France and England. 3
On July 29, Germany suggested that Austria accept the EngliSh
sugge stl. on about the "sel zure of host age t err1 tory" - that is, to
occupy part of Serb'!. a and then to have an arl!l1 stl. ce untll the
matter could be settled in some peaceful manner.

Austr' 'i-HUngary

delayed giving an answer to this suggestion so long that these
hoplls were dasheo to Jl~eces by the news of R1l8S~an l'lobi11 zation. 4
The German proposals for

ma~ntain1ng

the peace were shown to

be rsther half-heart lid by a di spat ch sent by Count Sz·ogyeny, the
Austrl an Ambassador 1n Berlin, on July 2'7, after hi s lntervl ew
with the Secretary for Foreign Affal.rfl, .Von Jagow , to ·Vienna •.

•

Count Szogyeny wrote:
The Secretary of State ~.e.clared to me in
strict confldence:
That the German Government had dec 1 ded to
acqua 1 nt Your Excellency shortly with Eng11sh
proposals looking toward possi ble oonc111 atton.

1. D.o cumenta :D1Jilomat1quu Frani.a1 s. XI, .2416 ..
2 • .AuetrllUl Red'ook, n . 111-'4. 158 -~ :

Of . , Sritfiii

l5OCiiment s • .xI . U3-4.

:&. Pal flolo gue, An Amlj!ssador' eRemol rs, I,. 40"l.

4. Ausi;ri8l'l Red""!ook, Ill, 37:
of., KautBkj":Outbreak of the World War, 369, 38'7.

-- ---
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That the GerMan Government ex:pl~ c~tly assured
us th 8t H ~ n no way ! dent ~ f1 ed ~ t s"lf wHh the se
proposals, th a t It was even Qulte oppose d to the
l dea of our c on sid ering the m, and th at ~t waB
C O M!T1Unlcat~ng t.hem t ,o us simply to comply with
thelrequest from the En~lleh th Rt we should do
BO.

-,

The Government of Fr ance, wMle agree i ng to accept the peace
pllUls prop o seCi. by t h e other Powers, h9.d !t s own plan for prevent

,

lng a general EUropean war.

Thls

~dea,

whl ah was energetlcally

promoted by P r e s ! del'\t }' 04ncar1l, was a plan whereby Germany mi ght
be caused to keep out of the war - thereby prevent i ng a general
European Viar.

The French urged .the Engl1 sh Government to declare

that, in the event of a war between F r ance and Germany, England
WO'l J.C. come to the a l d of t h e Frcl'\ ch.

They thought that such a

deol arati on would prevent Germany f'l'om SUIJport1 ng

A'l Atr~

so strongly and from opposing Russ i a so strenuously.!
Si r Franc ' s

B ert~e

telegraphed

S~r

a-Hungary '

On July 30,

Edward Grey:

I had aUdi ence of Pre~ident of the Republio
th i s even 4ng i n order to g ~ve h~m your message of
congratul at.! ons on suoce 88 of hi 8 v! 81 t to st.
Petersburg, 1'or whioh he wj shes me to thank you •
. . . . He ! s conv! noed that preservation of
p eaoe betwe en Powers i s j n hand s of Engl and, for
i f H~ s ~!;aJesty's Governmel"t announce that, 1.n the
event of oonfliot between Germany and Franoe, result
Ing from present differenoes between Auetr~a and
Serv I a, England would come to aid of France, there
would ~e no war, for Germany would at ol'\ce modify
her att ' t'lde.
I explalned to h i m how d~ff i oult ~t would be
for H~ s MaJesty's Government to make such an announoe
ment ,3
On the fo110wit18 day Ambassador Jules Camben at :8er1in reported

to P rami er Vi vi an!. in Pari ·s :

1.
2 •.

3.

m"n8ll
Ush
e L . ..

~ R2.2!., I I , 126-'.
Doouments,n , 200.
AAX
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/

/

. • II n'y a que l'even t uali.te de
l'tnterventton de l'Angleterre qui e!l'leuve
l'~pereuI' son Gouvernement et tous les
/
A
1nteret s.
•
Ambassador Paul Cal!lbon In London wrot e to Pari. s:

. .. . . I note th at durtng the last few dllYs,
very powerful German lnfluence i s bel ng exerc i s~d
1 n Pre s s and in ParI:! ament iby C1. ty men who are of
German orig i n. Several members of the Cab1net are
somewh at under this lnfluence, and it is posE:!hle
that Mr. Asqui th dare not as yet sti.ck hi s feet
In th~ ground. Personally he 1s all for i nterven
tion.
Pre '3';. dent Po)ncar~. in order to press the French pe ace plan
up'o n the Br1.t:!. sh, suggested to the French MIn:!. sters that he
write directly to King George V.
the French Government. 3
cour!er.

Hi

8

shoul~.

s u gge stion wa e ap pToven oy

'Ihe letter l'!as c1espatcr:ec1. by spec:! al

In that letter, WTltten on July 31, PreRid~nt POl ncare

wrote to the English K:!ng:
Cher :et Grand Ami - The European Si t1.lat:! on is so
serious that I think j t my duty to convey directly to
Your Majesty the lnformAtion WhiCh the Fr~nch Govern
ment has rece i ved from Germany. Her m:!l:!tary pre para
tions, especially in the ree~ons bordering on our
frontler, are da1.1y being :Increased anc1. hastened.
I verily beHeve that the best chMce of pee.ce
depends on what the British Government says and
does • . • • I all profoundly conv:!nced that at this
moment the more England, France a ·nd. Russia give the
impress:! on of cOfl1plete un1 ty in d1 plomat1 c act:! on. t.he
more it may be posslble stHl to look for the preserva
tion of peace. Your Majesty wlll. I trust, graciously
excuse this :!ntrusion. wh:!. ch :!s prompted only hy the
earnest desIre to see the balance of lffiropean Powers
definltely readjusted. 4

,.

To th i s. King George, on August I, repl:!.ed:

1. Doowaent . D1pl olla-t.1 quel!l Fran~a1s. n. 314-'5 .
2. ){emo1 rl!' of RaYmond Po1ncar~. -Ii. 242-3.

I. Ibid •• 24i.

I . Keao1ra

or

.

R~mond-.po :! ncare.

II. 245-6;

of.. DooUiDenli · Di plomatl ques Franc a1 s. n, .372-3.
32

It wo'lld he a source of real sat t sfaction
to me ~ four un!.t ed effort s were to meet w!.th
sucoess, and 1 fU!l sti ll n ot without hope that
the terr~ble events whioh seem so near 'may be
averted.

-.

•

am personally using my best endea"-ours w~th
the ~mperors of Russ 1 a and of Germany towards fln d 
1 ng some $oluti on by Vlh ' ch actual l!l!li tary
operati ons
may at any rate he postPQ1'1efi, and t1me be thuR glven
for calm dl scussl on between the Powers. 1 i n.tend to
prosecute these efforts w!.thout 1nterm< 8fl~on so lone
as any h ope rel!lsjns of un 8lII 1 cable settlemer.t • . • • 1
I

Si nce H

•

was l.mposs i ble to get s Br1tl sh declaration of poll cy

at tt 1 s t 1 me, the French could only hope that war might not come
and t hat j .f

I t d 1 d come Englanii would g!ve

I. Mem01rs of

ct.,

R~mond

Domena

1'0 j noare, 11 , 276:
Dhlomat1quea fran!jtrl s,

m ! l ~ t. ary

n.

a! d to Frsl'ce.

4,34,

.'
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CRAnER

v

-.
MOBILl ZATl ONS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR
~

The Austro -Hungari an Government, by a decree of July 25, set
July 28 as 'the date for the beginn! ng of a partl al mobil j zati on
of eight army corps and two cavalry d1,v.I Bions - against

S ~r'!lj

a;

but thl8 lias not a general moMlizat:\.on aBainst other European Power!H.
On July 27, p'r$,l!l1,er Viv 1 anl on board the

FMU1~" . (lurlng

r1s

return triP from Russia, sent instructions to Ambassador Paleologue
in Russia. 2

In accordance with those instructions, Ambassador

Paleologue, on July >28, told H. Sazonov that Franc~ weuld carry out
3
her obligations as , promised in the Franco-Russ! an Alll.ance.
eft
July 29, the Tsar was persuaded by the Russl an mlll.tary leaders to
agree to a general mobili zation of the ' Ru.ssl an force s, but he c ounter
manded the order before it could be 1 ssued.

These actions ,seem not

to have been reporie~ by Ambasslldor 'Pal~ologue ~tQ Pari,s.
~he

military leaders were successf'Ul in securing the

On July 30,

~sar's

approval

to Russi an '1llool 11 zat10n wh 1 ch would begin on July 31. 4
On July 30, M. Isvolsky, the Russ1an Ambassador, app,aled to
Preml er Vivlanj. who was back in Parls by that time, for aid ae
:promised in the FranCO-Russian AlUanoe and for recogn'tJ.on of . the
<!

•

1. I:aut ~. Outbre ak .!!! th e World!E, 219, 243.
2. DOC\1men'h D1 plomat 1111!~ ran~a1., XI, 118.

' 3. hid •.• 258.
.
.
4. l:aut ak7, Outbreat~ t he World War, 403;

of •• .Brit! 8h DOoUlllente,D, 191-=2.

•
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declarat~on made on July 28 by Ambassaaor Pa1~ologue to M. Sazonov.

Such a promi se was, Ambassador I svolsky stated, part1 C'ularly wel
•

come in the present circumstanc~s.

1

In reply to that appeal,

rremier VivlaTl~ . . on Jul;' 3C, sent anote to Russ~a ln whl. ch he sa~d;:'
that the French Government would r,eglect no opportunity to promote
peace and would fulfill her

all~

anoe obligations, but he

RUBel an Government, whi Ie taJdng prf'C8ut1. onary

(I

urged~

the

efense measures,

not to take lmmed' ately any step that might give Germany a pretext
for mob~1~zation.2
ed to bell eve that
tion;3

and

~t

Even on July 31,
Russ~a

Prem~er

V'v 1 anl stjll seem

was only taki.ng steps for pre-moMllza

was not until j.n the evenjng of the same day that he

recejved Ambassador Pe.lilologue' e telegram anr.oun ci ne the Ru s91 an
4
general mobUization.
Cn July 31, the Kalser wrote to the Auatrjan Emperor that
he thought that German mobilization would take place on August 2. 5
Germany, however, hail. to find some way of openJng hostillti.es
begir, n~ng

immediately after the

of

rnobil~

zatlon.

Therefore the

German Governmer..t iasuecl. an ultimatum to Ruas1 a on July 31 at
mtdnight stating that If Russi a d'l.d not cease all war measures
against Austrl a-Hungary and make

I!\ declarat~on

to that - effect to

Germany within twelve hours, Germany must mob"lize. 6
day Tsar Ji'icholas II wired to Kaiser

possIble to· stop Russ} an

mobilizat~

W111~am

1. DooumentS DiplomaMquee Fl'a%lgai8.

Ibid., 261-2.

II that tt was im-

on whl ch, l.nci.dentally. he

sal d. had followe~. Austrian mobilization. '7

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

On that BaJ1le

n,

Russia d 1 d not re

258.

Ibid., 336.
Ibid., 356.
..
Austri!Ul Red Book, III, '75-'7.
Kaut sky', OUtbreak o'f the World War, 404, 429.

'7. Ib:ld •• 402.

-

-
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1

/'

fuse the German ' dem'l.nd, but she certalnly (I'd fa~l to accept It.
Because no rl'lply to the ultlmatum hoo been rece'ved from RUBSl a
at noon on August I, the Germ8n declaration of war was despatched
at 12:52 P.M. and was to be deliverf'!d at 6 P.M. 1n Russl a by Count
'Pourt ale s.l
Austri a , dec l ded on AUB\let 1 to

mobili~e

the rest of the army

and to co n centrate i t in Galtcta, the fl ret day of mo't)il~, zat~, ot1
2
being A'lgust 4.
No alluston ",as made to ll'll'led!ate operat~ons
aga i nst Russi a, although

~[ol tke

had adv< eed that and r.ad proI!lJ sed

that Germany would mobilJze. 3
After war had been declared on Russl a, Alnbassador Jsvolsky
asked Parls what attitude Franoe would assume in the conflict.4
In his intervJew with President Pojnca~ Al'lbassador Isvolsky 1'e
ceived the reply that the French min ' sters would eUl"sly fulfill
their Alliance obligations, but that a declaratlon of \'Iar would
require Parl~ amentary appl"oVal. 5

Presi,dent Po', n('ar~ Rai d that

he hoped to avoid a public debate all the Franco-Russl an

All~

ance

on account of England, and that he preferre1 that war should be
declared by Germany instead of by France. 6
th i s statement, but

~,ecidsd

The m ,nl stry upheld

to wait for ten dRYS, ln order that

French military preparati one might be mOTe advanoed and ill order
to g i ve Germany a chaI"r1e to declare war on Fra!1ce, and thpn to
call a meeting of Farl iament.

Thl s was rather d! scouragl ng to

M. J svolsky. 7
The German mlli tary plans for war against both Russt a and

1. KautBk1. Outbreak of

~he

World War ,

432 -~.

2 . Auetrlan Red Book, -rrr:-eO .
--
3. Xaut.U:7. Oiitb~ R1. t he ' World War, 409 •
•• Memoirs of RaYmonrPolJiCar~. Il-;-!'72.
5._ IbU. ~!-I'r.
6. Memoirs of R~mond POincare, II, 272;
cf., Collected DiKlomatic Documents, 293.
7. Memo! rs .Q! Rayman Poi ncar§. II, 2'72.

France at the same t

~.l!le requ~

red th at a corfl1 ct between Germany

and :Franoe be started at once. l
Germany sent an ultimatum to France at the same t1me as the
one sent to

Russ~a.2

the demands

~ade

The Ultimatum to FraYlce

~ nformed FraYlce of

of Russi a and a sJt:ed whether FraYlce

'I'Ioul~.

rel!la~

n

•

The aYlswer must be gi ven ~ thin
3
Pre Si i' ent
eighteen hours, wh~ch t'\eaYlt b~r 1 A.M. August. 1.

neutral in a Russo-llerman war.

I'oincare.- has writtf'n a descr1ption of that

ipt~rvif'w

of AMbassador

von Schoen wHh ·Frem; er 171 vi ani • 4
. • • • Baron Schoen, like Herr Jagow, sa~ d nothing
about ~ecilariTl€ war ·on Russia jf she did not demoMlise;
he only foreshadowed war as a posslbl. l~ty, aYld he
aaked ViVi an1 whether 1n such an !!Vent FraYlce would
remain neutral. The qUf'stion had not been unfore
seen, and Viv~ani and I had agreed that :If it were
put, it would be w1ser not to say offhand that France
would do her duty as an Ally. Every moment v.td ch
did not accentuate international (11 fferences II1j ght
be a moment g9.~ned - for peace. The Prime Wni. st.er
sil!lply ejaculated: "Let 1116 hope there will be no
proceeding to .extremities, and g~ve me time to
think the thl ng over". Baron Scho en sal d he would
cOl'le for the answer early the next afternnon; it
was a thinly ve~led yet qu~te courteous ult1rnatul!l.5
The German Government had prepared Ambassador von S:(]hoen to 8ftY
that, in case Frel"ce should

prOI!l~ Be

to rel'lain neutral, Germany

demanded that France give up the fortresses of Tou! and Verdun
as a pl edge of

neutral~

ty to Germany duri.ng tr.e Russo-German war.

Baron von Schoen was rell eyed ·that the French refusal to 0.eclare
her neutralHy made it ur.neceS8'1ry for

h~m

to make i;he cor,tingert

demand. 6

1. .Austrian Bed Book, III . 51;
of •• xautiki. OUtbreak of the World War, 466-7.
2 . Kaut sky. outb-reak
the World War, 432-4.
:3. Ibi d ., 40(.
4. Memoirs of Raymond POincare, II, 264~5.
5. Ibid., 2~.
6. I bi d., 252.
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Bethmann Hollweg's tel~gl"am waA, of course, in
code, and the sec!'et addendum was coil. ell. ~ l' part! cul ar
ly diff5cult cypher.
• • • Dur!'ng the War the n l' al secti on of the
telegram, which had bf'en 1nterce.p ted and prese:rved,
was deciphered, and the secret 1t revealed was sent
out into the world as ev-i.dence that German::, had i.n
tended to sacr! fj ce the French people whatev~r they
d~o. fo):" the maintenance of.peace. l
Jrem:ier VIviani replJed that "France would be guided by her
interests,!2
~n

J'remi er V~vI ani not~ fled the French Ambassador

st. Petersburg, on August I, of Ms

dor von Schoen and
war

w~th

~

sa~

~nterv~ew

with Ambassa

d that he believed that Germany wanted a

France.

~'att~tude d'Allemagne prouve ~u'ell~ veut
la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la Franoe.
E~ er, lors~ue M. de Schoen est venu demander au
~uai d 'Orsay ~uelle atH tude la France compta1t
prp.ndre ~n oas de confl:! t russo-slleI!lande, l' Ambassa
dliur d'Allemagne, bien qU'!.! n'y ait d5reotement
entre la France et l'Allemagne auoun confl~t et ~ue
nous ~ons employe depu~ s Ie dllbut de la cr~ se et
emplo"~ons encore tous nos efforts en vue d'une
solution pac!fl~ue, a ajoute ~u'!l me pria~t de
pr~senter au F res~dent de la Republ~que ses hommages
et l:'''' C1 erC~ements et demanda~t ~ue 1'01' voulllt b~en
pr.endre "d~s dl s jiosi tions pour sa llropre personne";
nous SBvons egalement ~u'jl a deja. m; s en surete les
arch'''''es de l'Ambassade. Cette attitude de rupture
,des relat,i ons dlplomat! ques, Aens confl1 t direct et
bien qu'une r~ponse n~gative prec~ se ne lui a!.t pas
ete faite, eet car·acter!stlque de la volont~ a retee
de l'Allemagne de fat re la guerre 8: la France.
A

3

Or. August I, at 3:!i5 F.M. French mobil~ 7.ation

WJi8

ordere<1. 4

A notice of this mobil!. zationwas sent by Premlel:' Vlvlani to Am
bassador Paul Cambon i n London on the Saple day_.
Notre d60ret de mob'lisation est do~o une
lIIesure essentl elle ~ llrese;rvation. Le Gouverne

1. Wolff ,. The Eve of 1"314, 5'73.
2.Memoirs or-R~morur
inoare, II, 253.
3.Do"CumentsDiomat tles t FranoaiS, l!, 394.
4. Ibid., 410.
. .
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ment l' a aooompagn~e d 'une proo1amat1 on, sl..gn~e
du Pr~sident de 1a Repub11que et de tous 1es
Ilinisters, et dans 1aque11e i1 exp1ique que 1a
mobilisation n'est pas la guerre, qu'en l'~tat
aotuel o'est, pour la France, Ie meilleur moyen
de sauve.garder la paix et que Ie Gouvernement
d:e la a'publique multipliera ser efforts pour
faire aboutir les negociations.

-..

On August I, at 5 P.M., Kaiser WIlliam II, in the presenoe
of Moltke and Tirpl.tz, s1gned the dooument order1ng lIIobilizatiC1fl. 2
France made every possible attempt to avo 1. d any incident
that might cause the beginnings of hosti11t1es with Germany.
Furthermore Franoe, in order to seoure BrItish aid, IllUst prove
that she was not the aggressor. Therefore the Frenoh left, in
the~r

own territo:!"y, a neutral zone ten kilometers wlde (althoU8h

in places less) along the Franco-German front1er.

This was done

to insure that no aot by French troops would preoipl tate war
Germany.3

~. th

Premier Viviani wrote to the Frenoh am'bassadors:

• • • • comment Ie Gouvernernent allemand se
livre oontre 1& France Ii. des actes de guerre sans
provooation de nctre part ni d&claration de guerre
prealable de la s1 enne, alors que ncus avons sorupu
leusement resll ectfli la zone de d1x k110metres que nous
avons maintenue, m~me de~uis la mobil~sation, entre
nos troupes et la frontlere. 4
The people In thi s neutral zone objected to being left open to
German attack.

General Joffre falt that. with "German troops up

to the ·Frenoh border, oomplete French mor l1izatJ.on was necessary.
He wrote :
It 1s vI tally necessary for the Government to
know that every delay of twenty-four hours 1n oalling

1.
"DooUllents Di~10:t ifuea Franttie, XI, 419.
2 . fautiky, Out re
the Wor ''I' 4'~.
n,

Z• •8llioirs ~ Rf.mond""¥.inoar~,
42.
.
•t., Dooumen 8 DiIt0mat1Jueo rran'tt.~ II, 412.
•• Documents
, .!I:' •

D1ploma~ue8rangai8~

-
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/

up the Reservlsts and in sendlng the Telegramme de
Couverture 1011 have for Jts effect a set-baok tn our
forward concentratIon, that ls to say, an tnitlalloss
of 15 or 20 kilometres of terrj.tory wl.th eaoh day of
delay. The Compander-in-Chief oannot accept this
responsi bil ity.
~

EVen after it had been strategioally neoessary to abandon, on
August 2, the praotloe of

leavi~

a ten kilometer zone, which

had been deolared on July 30, undefended by Frenoh troops, the'
French army was still ordered to create no inc1dents of war.
In view of these systematto 1noursions General
Joffre now asked us to oanoel the order as to the 10
kilometre line. The Government waited a few hours
before agreeing, and it was not until the afternoon
that the restrtotions were oancelled and oomplete
l1berty as to movements of troops was accorded to the
Commander-in-Chief. Even then the Gen eral, in issuing
hls orders that evening to the Army Commanders, added
that for reasons alike national and diplomatic, it was
imperative to leave to Germany the entire responsibility
for hostilities. • •• 2
Thus 1 s shown the fact that France was determined not to be res})on
sIble for the war, that the deolaration of war was a stsp that must
be taken by Germany - and not France.

Prestdent Poincare stated:

• • • • it would be better for Germany to
deolare war on us than for us to declare war on
Germany.3
France did not want to deolare war because tt mjght lose for her
the atd of England, and it followed that.it was up to Germany to
recall her ambassador fj rst.
German troops invaded French territory several times before
a state of war existed between those two countries.

SOIne of

these invasions may have been accidental, but others proved

1. .smoi r8 of RaZllon4 POincare, II, 2~5.

2. Ibid.. 2'1!'.

3. Ksmoirs of Ra;vmopj

.

l',~nqari,

n,

272.
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to hsve been ordered by German officers.
Une patrouille allemande a penetre en terrltoire
s a J oneherey. L' offl.cl er qui 1 a comm!ll'ldai t a
brUle la cervelle !I. un soldat franQal s et a i!te tue
par les camarades de.celui-ci.
Une patrou~lle foulllant les VOl s a prif deux
uhlansy'ui vl.ennent d'Stre amenes g Belfort.
fran\la~

In hi s Memoirs President Pol.ncare wrote:

~

• . • • On the 3rd three German mounted men were
caught at COincourt, Rech~court and Remereville, and
on one of them, an off1cer, was found a patrol order
wh1ch told him to go as far as st.N~cholas du Port.
On the same day, before the declaration o~ war, an
aeroplane threw slx bombs over Luneville.
On the thl rd of August, Ambassador von Schoen handed to
Premi er Vi vi ani the German de cl arati on of war.
Les autorit~s administratlves et miHtaires
allem!ll'ldes ont consta~ un certa~n nombre d'actes
d'hostilite c.aracterl.s6s commis sur territoire
allem!ll'ld par des aviateurs militaires franpal s.
Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manlfestement ,jol~
la neutrali t~ de la Belgique BUl?'olant Ie territoire
de ce pays. L'un a essay~ de detruire des constructions
pr~s de Wesel, d'autres ,ont ete aper~us sur la reglon
de l'Eiffel, un autre a jete des bomtles BUr Ie chemin
de fer pr~s de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg.
ie BUis charg~ et j'ai l'honneur de faire
connaitre
V. Exc. qu'en presence de ces agressions,
l'Empire allemand se consid~re en etat de guerre
avec la France du fait de cette derniere Puissance.

a

Ma Ml ssion diplomati que ayant ainsi pr1 s fin,
il ne me reste plus qu'a prier V. Exc. de voulo1r
Men me munJr de mes passeports et de prendre les
meBUres qu'Elle jugeraH utiles pour assurer mon
retour en Allemange avec Ie personnel de l'ambassade
a 1nsi qu'avec Ie personnel de la 16gatiol' d~ Baviere
et de consulat general d'Allemagne
Parls.

/'

a

The German excuse for declaring war on Franoe was the alleged
violation by France of German territory.

Germany claimed that

French av1 ators had thro1fll b ombs near Nuremberg, but the re was

1. l)ocument s D1 plomat"ques Franeaia.XI, 48'7.
2. Memoirs of ~Hmond FOinoare,lI, 28'7-288.
3. Documents- nil!omatiques Franqais. XI. ~09-510.
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no proof that the aeroplanes were etther
nor that any

bo~bs

had been thrown.

~ilitary

The other

or French

Ger~an

story was

about an aeroplane raid over Wesel in which the aviator had been
brought down, but no corpse was ever found.

But Ambassador von

Schoen d1d not mention these fantastic stor1es sent to him by
Foreign Secretary von Jagow.

:

Concerning this Fresident

/

Foinc~e

wrote:
• • • • Why on earth did not the Ambassador make
use of this information in his letter? Dld he suspect
its fantastic character? He has explaned in hi s Memoirs
that the telegram wasso l1le81 ble that it could not be
entirely deciphered, Fd this explanation has glven rlse
to many suppositions.
French sentiment was now unified against Germany.

Even some

of the royalist leaders wanted to fight for France against Germany.
Among them were the Duo le Guise, Frince Roland of Bonaparte, and
the Duc de Vend6me.

Fresident Foincar~ wrote that he would have

been willing to accede to these requests but that the Cabinet thought
i t impossible without public discussion, which mIght be injurious

to French national unity.2
President

Foincar~

Concerning thess royalist requests

stated •

• • •. • these letters only go to prove that any
French dissensions 1Ihich existed yesterday have been
altogether sponged away today; it is indeed a unified
people which stands up under the Tricolgur flag to
speak effectively with a hulking enemy.
Fresident Foincare sent, on August 4, to the Houses of Farliament
his message, requested by the Cabinet and delivered by Fremier
Viviani, and it was approved and applauded by the Senators.

1. .~ulol re oj Rymon!
2. I-bU._. 2B.
3 .• Ib14. ., 296 .
_ .

l'o~ ncar' ,

II , 28.,.
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• France had Just been the object of
violent and p:!"emed 1 t ate,1 attack. wh1 oh ~.s an
insolent d~fianoe of the laws of nations. Be
fore any deolaration of war had bean sent to
us, even before the German ambassador had a~k
ed for hi s passports, our terr~tory had been
vi olated. l

-.

Franoe was at war with Germany. but Germany had not yet in
vaded Belgium. however she had 1.nvaded Luxem't>urg on August 2.2
Th1 s England tr1 ed to prevent.

•

Upon heaM. ng of German mobi11 za

tiol".. England took identical steps at Pari s and at Berlin.

On

July 31, the Eng].' sh Government asked whether the Frenoh and
German Governments would "undertake to respect the neutrality
of Belgium", so long as no other Power violated i t . 3
Governl'lent replied in the afflrmat1ve;4

but thll G-erman Govern

ment madl'! no direct reply, feeling that H
plan of cam:>:!!1gn.5

The French

m<ght disclose their

The BMM eh Min~ eter ~n Brussels asked whether

the Belgian Government would do everything in its power to mainta1.n
jts neutrality:

a statement whioh led Belgium to look forward to

BrHish intervent10n 1f her neutral1.ty were v1.01ated.

Belgium

replied that she would defend her own terr1tory.6
The German war plans. whi ch had: been made far i n
called for war on both the western deastern fron1s.

a~. vance,

These

plans, for a quick and decis1.ve blow against Fra nce and then a
war against Russia, had first been made by General Count Schlie
./

ffen, who was on the general staff, in 1894.

TM s plan had been

definitely accepted by . German m11itary leaders from 1912 on.

1. Sohmitt; Comine .Q! the War, II" Z"S-9;
of. ,lIelioirs of RqmOiil PciInoare , n . 2 96.
2 • .Dooum'ents D1Pfomat1H'e. Fr8llisis a.n, 442.
3. Brithb. Document.
,218, 33.
.
4. British Doouments, Xl, 234;
.
of., Doouments D!ploIDat1res Frani'ais, Xl, 380.
5. Bri ttSh Do ouments, Xl, 2 4.
6. fiiId-;-;-240, 286.
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Therefore, 1 twas neoessary to begin military operatl.ons against
France at the same tIme as those aga~nst Russia. l

In order to

begin operations against France i t was nec·essary for German troops
to oro ss throU8h

Bel~

um . . The Belgian Government reali zed H s

possible danger from a German attaok and took steps to try to assure
her safety.

On the 31st of July, Y. KlobukowSki. the Frenoh Yinister
~

in Brussels, wrote to Premier

Vi~. ani

saying that the BelgIan Govern

ment had aSked whether France would respect the neutraU ty of
Belgi= and that he had repHed that France would do so.2 Such
.
~
3
as.uranoe was confirmed on August 1 by the French ~overnment.
France offered atd to Belgium when her forces would be ready and
Belg1= rp.pll ed with thanks but dit1. not then appeal to the Powers. 4
On August I, Germany de11vered her ultimatum tc Belgium.
This note said that Germany had learned that France was going to
advance through Belgian territory aga!nst Germany.

Germany, there

fore, must advance through Belgium, and she promIsed, <f Belg<um
would remain neutral and permit this, to guarantee Belgian r1ghts
and independenoe atter the war and to pay Belg' um f or any damage
done.
reply

If Belgium resisted, she would be treated as an enel'lY; a

.a.

demanded within twelve hours.

On August 3, Belgium

asserted her neutrality anel satd that she would use all her power
to repel the passage of German troops.5
./

On the 2nd of August, t he German arm e s i nvailed Luxemburg. 6
.King Albert of

Bel~. =,

on August 3, asked King George for

1. Austrian Red Book, I l l , 'I ll; '
,
of., KautBii,-:oitllrel!ik fit the World War, 330-1.
2. Documents DhlomatiQues"r'iiiiah, 1I:-!77.
&. ieme1rs of R lion Po!noai"e, II, 263;
ef., DooUiiients D1 lOll1ati Uee Fran~aie, D, 380, 417-8.
4. Memoirs of Raymond Poinoare, II, 82.
5. Austrian Red Book, lII, 104-'5 ;
,
of., British Documents, n, 301-2;
of., Kaut Sky , Outbre8lC of theY/orld War, 330-1.511.553-~,585.
6. Documents Diplomatiques Franlais, n. 442 • ..,
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"diplomatio intervention";

S~r

Edward Grey, on the s am e day ,
promised int ervention if Belgian neutrality were violated. l

On the 4th of August, Belgium, too, was invaded by the German
2
arm ~ es on t he'r w~ to f i ght aga1n~ Franoe.
Warfare on the

-.

western front had begun.
From the moment that Franoe began to feel the probabi 11t,t
of a general European war 1 n whi ch France would take part, French
diplomacy was directed toward learnJng whether she could count upon
Engl i sh sup port.

On July 30, Ambassador Paul Cambon r eminded

Edward Grey of the agreement of 1912 ,3

5~ r

that England bad und e r

taken to Join with France i f the peace .of Europe we"'e t hreatened.
Th l e threat, said the French, now ezi eted because Germany was
beginning her military preparations.

At that time the Bri tish

Foreign Offloe was unable to make a statement, due to Cabinet
di ssensJ.on.

On the next

d~,

suoh an aTiswer was made by the Brl ti sh

Ambassador in Paris.
The letter of President Po :t noarl to K1.ngGeorge V wae p ol~te
ly received on July 31, but the King's reply stated that "England
could not yet ~ake a stand. 4
On July 31, PremierV1viani received the following despatch
from Ambassador Paul Cambon in London :
L'Ambaseadeur d'Allemagne ayant demand~
ce matin Ii 51r E. Grey s11'Angleterre obeerver
ait la l1eutrali te dans Ie conflH qui semble
i mmj nent, 5i r E. Grey a · repondu "que l ' Angleterre

1 . EM tie Doouaent., n. 809.
2 . Br1ihi DooUlllenjf' Xl. 3U:

of •• DOCUlllent.plo.at1g,ue.Franea1s~ 11, 5041.
3 . See abon, Pace i . .
4. Doewaents D1plolla«g,ues Pranea1 s. II, 3'12.-3, 434 •
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'"

ne

~ourrait

pas rester neutre dans un conflit

g~neral et que, si 1& Francl1 ~ etfH 1mpllquee

l'Angleterre y sera!t entra,nee."
Franoe

notlf1ed ~ England

of the German ultimatum and the

levering of dilllomat!c relstions between Franoe and Germany.
Ambassador Cambon told Sir Edward Grey that France was

e~Gsed

to attacks on land and on eea, the latter beoause, in agreement

•

with England, Franoe h!li concentrated her !laval forces in the
MedHerranean Sea.

BUt the reply made was that the J3riti Bh Govern

ment, since publlc opinion was not yet orystallized, could not
make a defin! te st atement to France.

2

On August 1, Sir Edward Grey informed Ambassador Cambon that
Frll.l'lce had a chll.l'loe to promise Germany to remain neutral, and
t}lat therefore the s i tuation was different from the Morocco inci
dents.

lience England need not aes1.st Franoe, but this d i d not

mell.l'l an absolute refusal by England to gi ve any assi stance what
ever to FranGe.

Englll.l'ld had at that t!.l!!e decided agail"st sel"d:tng

an expedHionary military foroe to the oontinent.

But a change of

attitude was llossible. 3 
On the morning of Auguet 2, the situation was still doubtfUl
and the British Cabinet refused to eanetion intervention."

In

the afternoon S1r Edward Grey made the following promise of oondl
t10nal support to Ambassador Paul Cambon:
1 am author! sed to gl ov e the' assurance that, 1 f
the German Fleet oomes into the Channel or thr01l8h
the North Sea t<J unde-r take hoetlle operati on s againet
Frenoh oo-asts orllhipping. the British Fleet will
give all t .l le proteotion in it. pow-er. This assuranoe

1- Docnuaenh Di 10111&1;1 1lIlS F~anUh. XI. 36&.
2. lemoirs of
ond · G1nearfl. II, 268;
of., Britr . DocUllentj,
,2~3.
3. n ___ !wenty-f1ve Years,ll, 41-2;
British Documents, XI, 2~3, 260.
4. ~ •••• sh Documents, XI, 274-5, 278.
~
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is, of course, BubJ ect to the pol~ cy of the Govern
ment rece1v1ng the support of Parliament, and muet
not be taken as MnMng the Government to take any
&otJ.on untH th~ above contingenoy of action by the
German Fleet takes plaoe. l
But the Cabinet was unable -to promIse to intervene if Franoe were
attacked by Germany; that deolsion was for Parliament to make.
On the mornIng of August 3,· news of the German ultimatum to

•

Belglum reached London.

The Cabinet then decided to mobilize.

Sir Edward Grey told Parliament that England would stand behind
France and Belgium, and M s speech was appla_U ded. 2
On August 4, Sir Edward Goschen, the
u pon Von Jagow.
Belg! um had

dec~

Brit~eh

Ambassador, called

He stated that the -entry of German troops into
ded the Britt ell Government to demand a satj sfactory

reply by mldnJ_ght, or ellle England would do everytMnj(poBsible to
guarantee Belgian neutrality which had been guaranteed in the treaty
to which both nations had agreed.

SInce no promise was forthcoming

from Germany, Sjr Edward Goechen demanded
:3
time limit was up.

h~e

passports when the

On August 4, Ambassador Paul Cambon reported

from London:
Le Gouvernement br~ tannl que n' a reQu aucune
reponee de Berlin au euJet de la neutra1it~ belge,
mais 11 a apprie de souroe tndir('tcte, et le rlmse!:g:ne
ment a ~te conflrm~ par l'ambassade d 1 Allemagne !
Londres. que Sir ~d. Goechen avait re~ ses passe
ports ce BOlr. En co n s~quence. l'Amlrautt! a
prevenu les escadres anglal ses *ue la guerre
comrnenyait ce eoir ~ 11 heures.
And so France was noll to have the aid of England 1 n her war aga l net
Germil.ny.

The war which was to last for more than four years had

begun f -or France, E!!81and, Belgium, Russia, Germany, andlustria
RUIl&ary, and H

wa s then in full bla. t.

•

•

• /1> "

1. Cambridge R1sto~ of Britt ah F orel gn PoB 01, III, tIOl.

2. KautSky, Outbre

Of

the World War,

:3. Bri ti sh Document s, Xl, 314. 351.

4. Documents Diplomatiques Franvai s,
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CHAPTER VI
•

RESPONSIIlILI TY OF POINCARf AS VIEWED BY HI STORr CAL

WRITERS AND RESEARCH SCHOLARS

,
Poincar~

In thi s study of the role played by President

in

the negot1. ati ons between June 28 and August 4, 1914, it is now
possi hIe to arri ve at something approachine; a defirli ti ve con
clusion regarding responsibility.

But first it ; s appropriate

to consider the judgments of some of the most authoritative writers
who deal wi th the subJ ect.
Since the outbreak ot the war, and more parti cularly sInce
the peace treaty was made, many persons have given long and hard
study to the doaumentary material appearing from various govern
ment arcbives to determine the degree of guilt or responB 1 b1ll.ty
of thiS, that or the other government for having brought about the
War in 1914.

Article 231 of the Versailles

tr~aty,

the so-called

"war gui.l t" clause, may be sai.d to have set off the po st.-war cam
paign to discover the truth.

Whi le German soholars have been es

peei ally act1.ve in thi s work, naturally, in order to clear thei r
own country of the blame, eminent scholars of many nations have
contributed their bit to our knowledge of

tod~.

,..

Some of the

writers quoted below arB Amerioan historians, for example, Professors
Schmitt and Fay, who haTe made painstaking stud1 es ot the oauses
ot the World War. haTin& begun the.ir wo!l: snn durin, the c!)nfl1et.
)(• .Renourtn cd If. Bloch are well-boft !'renck hi .s torianson the

•
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subJ eot.

There are also some former ofn c1 al s, pol1 tl oal

opponents of President

Po~noar6,

and others.

Eaoh author has

formed ' a definHe opinion about the respons1 MlHy of Pre sHent
Poinoar/!.

-.

Stdney Bradshaw Fay, Professor of Htstor,y at Harvard, in
his Origins

~ ~

World War, 1930, has made soms pertinent

~

remarks.
'. • • . At fl rst, dUM ng ths War, wr~ te!'s s O1l8ht
to fix the "gutl t" for havl ng caused thi s unparalleled
"oril!le" upon a few single !ndlv1. duals - oMefly the
Kaiser, the Pan-German~. sts, and the Austrian and German
mil~tarists.
Then, with the publioat~. on of !'lore complete
doouments whioh began in 1919, it was seen that the
Entente thesl s of the sole respons~ M.ll ty of Gerl!lany
and her allies was no longer tenable, and writers who
del!landed a "revislon" of the Treaty of Versaliles tend
ed to go to the other extreme of fixing the "guilt" upon
Entente leaders -- MY. Izvolski, Poinoar6, Sazonov, and
even upon 8ir Edward Grey. Finally, with the growlng
realization that all the Powers were more or less respons
ible, and with the ino!'eased attention whlch cam~ to be g~ven
to the underlyin! oauses of the War, more jud1 c 1.oualy and
hi stor! oally minded persons were less inolined to aooept
the easy solution of expla1 n!n! the War on the soape
goat or personal devil theory - that 1. S, of the "gu~. lt"
of this or that individual. They fell baok on :the truer
explanation that the War Was caused by the system of interna
tional anarohy involved in alliances, armaments, and
seoret diplomacy
But, after all, the "s'y stem" was work
ed by individuals; their personal acts built tt up, and
oaused it to explode in 1914. In the di souse1 on of the
future, it will be the work of the h!storian to explain
the politioal, eoonomio, and psyoholog 1 oal motives which
oau sed these 1.ndividuals to act ~s they did. lie will
also cease to talk about "war guil tit; sinoe no person
in authority was guilty of deliberately workin! to
bring about a general European War. But he will still
oontinue to d1 souss the "responsibi11 ty" which eaoh
statesman must bear for !lote which . ultimately contri
buted to the catastrophe.~
Poincar~'e

He hae given the following olinioD of President

writ

' .DgB about the war in the period fro • . 1926-1931 •

•

•

1 • .,~, · Origine of the World War, !93()., I, 2-3.

..,

t9

,

• • • • To be sure, M. Poinc ar~, in the fourth
volume of his memoirs, has made a skilful and
elaborate plea, to prove "La France innocente".
But he is not convincing. It is quite clear that
on hi s vi si t to' Russ 1.a he assured the Tsar's Govern
ment that Franoe would support her as an ally 1.1'1
preventing Austria from humiliatiD8 or crusMng
Serbia • • • • Pres l.dent polncar~, upon ·his return
to Franae, made efforts for peace, but hIS great pre
oooupation was to minimize French and Russian prepara- '
tory measures and emphasize thosfl of Germany, in
order to secure the oert ainty of Brl t1 eh 8Upp0rt 1.1'1
a struggle which he now regarded as inevttable.
Concerning President. Poincare's orltics and his

.

;•

,

repons~. bility

for the war, .IIr. Fay has written i n 1930:

M.

Poipoar~'s

most severe oritios have been

M s own oountrymen - Pevet, Judet. Fabre-Luce,

Converset, Morhart, Viotor Margueri tte, Lazare,
and a host of lesser Hghts. They have charged
Mm ~. th getting rid of cautious ambassadors like
M. Georges Louis in st. Petersburg and M. Crozier
in V1.enna to make way for a ohauvinIst like M.
Delcass~ or puppets like E. Paleologue and .II.
Dumaine, in order that he ml~t be more free to
work with Izvolski in bringing about a war which
should reoover Alsace-Lorraine for France an~
secure ConstantInople and the Straits for RUBsia.
Many of hIS replies to ~helr oriticisms are sound.
He manages to explain away Aome of the incr1minat~D8
'remarks that Izvoll3ki attr1butes · to him. But
in many other case s he seems to take refuge in the
praotice of throwing dust 1n the reader's eye by
(Hvert1ng attention frOI!l the main point to minor
matters •
• • • • He believed a European war "inevit
able"; in tighteniD8 the Entente and in making
promises to Russia he did in fact tend to make
1 t inevItable.
Herein 11 e s hi s re spon s1 b11i ty.2
Herman Lutz, the Offioial Historian of the Bavarian Parlia
mentary Comml.ttee on War Responsibility in 1925, in hI s Lord
Grey and t!lLWorld

!!!:, .. :1>92.8,

has written:

• • • Cert ai nly the bl'oad "SS8.11 of the
French people ·were anxioull f er pe .~e and had no

or-

1. Fay. Originll
th, Yor14
2. Ibid.•• I, !4-!7

1£.
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II.
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desire for a war for rev8lIche; but not so a number
of the prominent persons in power. Among the latter
first place belO!!8s to Deloass!!, PoInoar€~ and Pal'i!o
logue. They an~ tho Be who thought 11'1 th them naturally
too~ oare not to give publio expression to their
secret desires, hopes,' .and aims. Po~. noarfi also
adm~tted . that there was no direct way out; for
this reason he f'ed the Russo-French All:l.anoe "on
the Austro-Rus s1 an ri vulry in the Balkans", f':I.x
ing hls gaze always on "the hole i n the Vosges".
• • • • For no less a person tha~ Polncar~
hJmself bore witness af·ter the war that
"Dur1ng my school years my spIrit,
oppressed by the defeat, unoeasingly
crossed the f'rontier which the Treaty
of' Frankfurt had imposed on us, and
when I climbed down from my oastles in
the air I saw no reason for en stenoe for
my generation but the hope of recovering
the lost provinoes,-l

.

:.

•

He has stated that President Poinoare's vislt to Russia, al

though his conversations there ramal.n

unkno~.servell

Russi 'a to be ! i rill with Austrla-Hungary.2

to incite

But I have f'ound no

dooumentary evidence of this contention.
Alf'red Fabre-Luoe, a former French diplomat who was one of
President

Poinoar~'s

countrymen

an~ pol~tioally

hostile to the

President and whoa the latter aocused of f'alsifioation and mis
representation of doouments and statements, voiced his opinions
in The Limitations

£!

V1otory, in 1926.

Yost of those who returned :po1noar6 to power
'believed that the antagonism between German Imperial
ism and France's resentment must inevitably be fought
out some day. They thought it neoessary to make
open preparations for the sanguinary etl"1l8gle by
strengthenir~ tteir armaments and alliancee.
They
. ,e re of opinion that stro!!8 p.o l1o'y might. in a fell'
years, oreate the oond1tions neoessary to ensure a
Franah vi otory, and, as it had to be f'8ced, they

1. LutE, Lora

~

2. I bid. ,"'!Ji-~

and

•

~

World

!!£, 188-9.
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hoped that the confli ct might take place at a
favourable moment. ~~en!h! da: ~, they
Od 
thought less of ,taking advantage of
will or hesi tation shown :!lz. Germany, -1l ~
Interest of peace than of over-throwinf her
the momentehe ma Ae a in~stake. Nor did hey
forget that-rhe day on whicn war broke out
would also be the awaited day of revanche.
fhey assocl ated plans of conquest with France's
defensive poliOY, whioh were k~pt dark until
hostilities were opened, but were then reckon
ed amongst the objects of the war.l

i? fh

;

.

,

It may be that the above o:ptnion is b1 ased by the author's
:pol i ti cu! di slikes;

Concem1ng Presl dent Po~ ncar~ and Ambassador

I evol sky he wrote:
. . • • Ievolsky's reports were :published ln
and they attributed incautious remarks to
Poincar~; but T sari st Russl a had :pen shed and
Isvolsky was no more. By sacrificing the dead it
was still possible to save the French Government:
Poincare no longer tri'ed to prove the .joint innocence
of the AIHgs, a& before but blamed the Russi an
ambassador.
MOSCOW,

Be said about President Poincare's trip to Russta:
There was, consequently, no po s sI. bl e doubt as
to Polncarels att1tude tn Petersburg between the 20th
and 23rd of July. WHhout havtng tl:le least idea
of the nature of the Austrian demands, or of Germany's
intentions, he took up a position of firm opposltion
to wh'oh he gave a defin l te character, and from which
he did not, as a matter of fact, recede in the 8l1.8ht
est degree to the end. SUoh a polley assumes that the
adversary's will is a b11nd force, incapable of chang
l.ng or den ating from 1 ts course, and thus i! oes away
with all ternptation to develop a pacifl c tendency.
From that time onwards, tr.ere was very little chance
of averting the war, and, moreover, Poincar~ had left
Russl a carte blanche to let it 100 se whenever she
liked,selling that two days after his departure
Pall!ologue, aotiIl8 on his instruotions, iPromised ·
SazonoT unconditionally that, from the moment the
Aunrl'an ultimatum was deli Tered, France ",%uld tulfill
all t)J.e obl1gationsof her all1ano.e • • • •

<'



1. Fabre-Luoe, fhe L1mttations of ·T ietory. 119.
2. Ibi d., 23.
3. Ibid., 182-3.
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oonCllus~

on 1 s not borne out by the

Er1 ch Brandenburg, the German hi

~, ocuments

st~rian

ava 11ahle.

who has taught at

--

Heidelberg a1'Id Leipzig,
in his book From B1 smarok to the World
.~
War, 1927, has sai d that President Poinoare and I evol sky worked
:to brine about the war.

-

He has used almost ent'rely German

'.

sources and seems not .to have been fam11tar with ' the works of
Professors Schmitt, Fay and Renouvin, and he could not have hatt
any acqua 1 ntance with Pres1dent Po~nc & re's own account, wh 1 ch was
published in the following year.
Wi th Franoe and Russ~, a the case was qui te
different, I 60 not doubt that the great body
of the people even in these two co~tr'es were
desirous of peace. In the rultng Circles, both
1n Paris end St.Petersburg, there were two parties;
the one wanted peace jf it could be mainta'.ned con
. sistently with honour, the other wanted war. In
Franoe the latter oombined wl.th ,t hose who cherish
ed the idea of revanohe, wMoh had never ·die!\ out.
Poirio~re and Deloas86 were its great protagonlsts.
S~ noe the brush ' wHh Germany in },Iorocco and the
founding of the Entente, th 1,s party had greatly
strengthened its tnfluenoe; and f1 nally, with
Poincare as leader it had as~med the ' real ma1'lage
ment of affairs. In Russi a the: Czar was the head
of' the peace party; for ,8 long time tn,e war party
was wHhout any real leader. ,Wide military c1roles
and all those who favoured Pan-Slav ideas Elupport
ed the war party at St.Petersburg. In Iswolski,
after his personal reverse in the Bo'gn). an orJ s1 s,
they found a zealous ohampion. As Ambassador in
Pari s ,thi s vain and, vengeful lIIan fell wholl;Y
~der the sway of the Delcasse and P01n08Te group
and rendered ' it the greatest service bf his person
al influence. Hts despatches from Par~ s, the pubU
cat i on of whi ch in a German t ranal at1 on ha snow
been completed, show olearl;y to anyone who is not
blinded by prejudice, b;y what oautious and subtle
methods Iswolski, in conjunction wlth POinoaTe,
prepared for the war. He knew how to get rid of
refractor;y elements like Georges LOUie, the Fr~noh
j,lIIbaseador in St. Petersburg, ho. to bribe the
pre ss and make US8 of j. t. and lao. to exploit the
i n.aUable TWtZ ot Poinoare . I t 11 -reaU.z
tUtttCftllt to •." * 1oh ot tl1e t., led and whiah
toliowed. ther e i . BO doubt a .. to the~r oloae
oo-o)le ratlo n. ....01*1 carmot rep-eat too otten
what 800d luok i t is that POinoarli, and Jlot

~

,,
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some other less reliable !lJ1d less skilful polltici an,
stands at the head of France. l
This viewpoint s .eems to me to have a purely nationalist prejudic .. ,
since the author has' failed to consult all the documentary material
avaHable.
In The International AYla1'chy, 1926, G. Lowes DI ck1nson, an
Engli sh author, has said that A...bassaodr I svolsky was particul\rly
elated by M. POInCare'S elevation to the PreSidency, and that he
wrote to Russ1 a how fortunate such an event was for RussI a and told
on . what friendly terms he was wlth the new PresIdent.

Yr. Dl. ckinson

has quoted two remar):., that were attrIbuted to Presj deYit Poincare

.

early in 1914, by Y. Judet, a Frenchl!lan whose personal and polItIcal
dislike for President Foincare ar'e shown in hj s writ1,ngs F.J1d who was
bani shed from France for a nUJllber of years.
"In two year'S the war will take place ·. ,All
my efforts will be devoted to preparing for j t . "
"Whatever be the issue, small or great,
which may ari se in the future between Russia and
Germany, i t w~ll not pass by lIke the last. It
will be war."
."

Pierre Bemus, the foreign editor of the Journal des Debats
,and ' correspondent of the Journal de Geneve, in his art1 cle on
President Poinoar6 in the Encyolopaed1a Brjtannlca, has said:
• • • • In power, he endeavoured to cement
the frt endsM,ps and strengthen the alll ances of
France. At a later stage, hiS enemies at home
and abroad crjt~c1sed him severely for his
po11cy; yet it is hardly ' reasonable because a
man IS sufficlently far-seej,ng to appr€'heYld a
storm and make preparat10n for It, to accuse
hIm of wishing to hasten it. He claimed that
he iUd his utmost to avert war, holding that
the w8,J to prevent the oonflictwas for those
powers &t!ain st who. the \IIenaoe .all directed to
prellent a powertDl aDd united tront, thus mak
ins At imprUdent t o .t te~tanl aot of aggress
iOll .

...

1. Brandenbur8, From Bismarck to the World War, 1520.
2. Diokinson, The:Internationar-Anarchi, 34S:
3. Eno,yclopaedIaBr1. tannlca, iVIII, 11 .
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Cam! lIe Blooh, the Frenoh hl stortan and professor at the
Sorbonne who is the director of the

Bibl!oth~que

-'tion Internationale Contemporai.ne · -et

de Dooumenta

lfus'e de la Grande Guerre

--

and who helped edit the Documents Diplomatiques

Fran~ais,

has

stated his opinions and oonolusion on the question in his book,
~

Causes of the World War, whioh was published in 1935.

He

first states the question:
The question must ari se as to whether any ohange
of atti tude oocurred at the time of the vl sl t to st.
Petersburg and whether the Frenoh statesmen oan be
aooused of urglD8 a P.lore aggressi ve attt tude upon
their Russian oolleagues, in an evem' more preoarious
European situatl.on. Did Pres1 dent Potnoare, as has
been alleged, "strE!l),gtbm the hands" of the partl sans
of strong aotion on the part of Russia agalnst
Austria? Was there then (as has been believed)
some kind of agreemant between the leaders of French
and Russian polioy, of whioh Pal6ologue. the Frenoh
ambassador, Ias aware and -the import of Whioh he
exaggerated?
Y. Blooh has been unable to find any evidenoe that Presl-dent
Poincare influenoed Russia toward war.
We now oome to the dooument whioh bound the
two governments,namely the communiquG2 in whioh
the conversations of the previous days were offioially
summed up, and of whioh a preliminary draft had been
made by Pal6ologue. I~ affir~ed the "perfeot oon
oordance n of "views" of the two Gove.rnments and their
"intentions 'for the maintenanoe of European equilibrium,
especially in the Balkan peninsula" •.
When it was submitted to the French visl.tors,
this draft struok them as oomro 1 tting Franoe too far
"i.n following Russi an polt cy j n 1he Balkans". They
therefore modified it in aocordance with the desire,
expressly enunciated by PoIncare and Viviani, to
"leave the future unmortgaged", to "under,l ine our
pacific intentions". and to "further safeguard our
liberty of action" - 'phrases which were the very
oppOSite of any encour.a gement to war.. The final
Tenion of the ·oo.muni!lUe 'thus arriTed at simply
af~1 raed the two Gove rnment s' ·oo.ple~. eommun'ty·

•

1. Bloch, The Causes of the World War., 110.
2. See abOve', page 10. - 

..
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•
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of"views about the various problems wM,ch regard
for gene'ral peace and Jl:urop ean equili br~ urn crl!ate for
the Powers, espec~allJ' in the East". There 1s to be
found in it no ~nd~cation of that "anything but oalm
ing" influence wh~ch the Austro-Hungarian ambassador
attr:l buted in advance to the Pres1 dent of the French
Republ~c, at a moment when he was already '!IWare of
the text of hl B own Government's Ultimatum to Serbla.
The communiqUe reveals no more than an effort to pre
'v ent IUBB~ a alone undertakIng any l!alkan adventur!!,
or rashly involving her ally.l
In 1912, President POincare, during his

v~,

,

sit to Russl a, had

learned the true nature of the Balkan pacts whi ch appeared to be
offensIve as well as defensive, a fact whi ell differed from the
reports by Russia. 2
insure itself

aga~nst

Therefore the French Government wanted to
beil'1g carelessly drawn into a war.

M. Bloch has given Ms conclusion in Ms "General

part

~mary",

xn:
In the conversation mich had taken place a
few days earlier in St. Petersburg between Poincar.e
(the French President), V! vl,an;, (the Premier),
N~cholas II and Sazonov, it is imposs~ble to find
any proof that the French statesmen urgecl. the Russians
to decl are war.:3

M. Bloch has carefully used the documents al'1Q wr:ltings concern'ng
the World War origins from the various countries involved.
Theodoi' Wolff, the editor of the BerHner Tagblatt during
the World War and up until the advel'1t of the Nazi regi me, has
g< ven 80me argument 8 favorable to President POinoare 1.n h; 8 book
./

wr~tten

in 1936, The Eve of 1914.

Frenoh wrl ters have contended that at bottom
was impressionable and weak.
They have
painted him as a conqueror quIte without resolution
of character, looking hesitantl, OD all aideB be
fore every decl, eion • • • • How did thi s man of
Poincar~

1. BIOCh'.1'l'lfu ,.oitM World War, 114-5.
2. Kemoirs 0
aymon~o!ncar~, I, 213-5.
3. Bloch, The Causes of the World War, 188.

--

----
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hesitations succeed in treaning such lofty and
dangerous paths? • • • •
But t'here . must be eomB explan ati 011 of the
fact if a man "Who neither sh1nes amid -the oommon
greyness through his personality, nor is able to
win heartl! through tke warmth of his own, appears
again and again to a great numberof hi s compatr1 ot s
to "Ie the obvious, almost the Ir;Mspensable manager
of their affairs • • • • In a book called Les Princes
Lorrains Albert 'I'h 1baudet 'lias indl cated the bond that
un!. ted the Frenah people, or at all event s the French
bourge01sie, with Polncar~. This exoeptionally
Industrious worker, thi s watchful off1 c1 al, •• •
this lawyer crammed with knowledge of the codes • • •
was, in a country whl ch sl noe the great Revoblt10n
• . • had seen the expounders of the law at jts head,
• • • a ~epresentat1ve of the general average of its
ojtizens • • • • The sober-minded and economIcal
French father of a family recognized Poinoarl'l as
more closely akin to hl mself, and • • • he believed
that he found l.n Poincare the re11 abilJty for
whioh • • • he was fundamentally concerned. l

•

•

• • • • People s~ "in oase of eme~genoy"
when they no not want to pa~tIcularize any
definite emergency. So It oertainly was with
PoIncare. A man of h1 a type doea not del~herate
ly want and work for wa·r, but may oontir..ually
dwell on the idea of the inevitaMljty of a war
untH at 1 aet he fi rrnly b e11 eve s in 1. t and then,
In order not to fajl through Inadequate prepaJ"a
t 1 0ns ohooses a path "in oase of emergenoy" which
even I'll thout an emergenoy 1 s full of (langer. It
seems to me that Alfred Fabre-Luee is much too
oonfident in M a assumption of a definite purpose
in the PO.incare of 1912 when he wrItes: "Ill every
j.nternati onal i sINe Foinc are. we1.ghs h1 s ahances.
If he meets with adverse willde, he waits for a'
better opportun 1 ty". Poin care, however, thought
that war could no more be prevented than a volcan~. c
eruption. And ae the eoothsayers were so sure of
their message they took no thought for means of
cooling men's hot head"but prepared opinion "in
case of emergenoy~2

/

1. Wolff, 'l'hl! EYe of 1914, 116-'.
2. Ibid.,
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Pre s~ dent Poincare travelled a ereat dl'al
about the oountry • • • • The wor!! "peace" was
to be found <n everyone of h1 s speeches; but
alwa.Ys · he unfurled the flag of a "great and
strong" France and let 1 t be understood that
he, or France, would n ot shrlnk in emergency
from a dec 1 s~ on by arms. He spoke as Tht ere
had spoken in 1840 again st the too pacifi c
Guizot: "S1 la France recule, elle descend
de sa rangn ~"If France Shrinks back ehe
loses her proud place."l
•

•

•

• • • .1 t has been stated that he sajd
tn DuIlkerque that "1 t woul d be a mt sfortune
if war were avoided, for we shall never again
be able to wage war under such favourable
circumstanoes as now". He denies having made
any statement of the sort, and at hi swish
eye-wi tnesses have attested th'S fact and
diSposed of the maltoious fable.l~

IT' General Joffre's Mel!loi rs there 1 s a
report of discussions at the beg1nn i ng of
1912. The French General Staff had received
news once more of the intended German l n
vasion of Belgium, and Joffre spoke at
l~ngth on the question whether the French
army should march into Belgium n at the
very beginning of the operati on", l.n order
to forestall tae enemy. He himself, Mille
' rand, the Minister of War, and Delcasse,
M~ ni st er of the Navy, were in favor of
forestalling, but Poj.nca!'e, thePrime Mtn
i ater, disagreed. The French entry into
Belglum, he said, must at least have the
justifioation of an actually imminent
German invasion. 3

...

1, Wolff ,'.rhe be of 1914, 283.
r . r - r - -"
2 ·. Ibid., 00• •
3. Ibid., 627.
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George Peabody Gooch, the Brit1 sh histortan, has given
the following op'n:l.on of Presl dent Potncare in hi s History of
Kodern Europe, 1922 •
• • . • the ele'otion of Poincare as Presiilent
in January proclalmed the new spirit of confldence.
The atmoepher i. c change was recorded and analysed
in a series of dispatohes from the Belgian Minister
in Pari s. " . . • • To say that the French nati on
has become belUoose would be going too far • • • •
. The men at the head of affairs are sincerely pacif'e,
but their action is excesslve. It is good to restore
to a nation 1 ts dignity, but I!angerous to foster its
ohauvinism. ~hey began by military parades and
marchlll§ through Paris • • • • It must have pleased
Poinoare, the Lorrainer, on the f1rst day of hie
off:! Oe to affirm hi s resolve to hold the flag erect.
In these troubled moments there is the danger of
his presence at the ilysee. One hopes hls cool and
practi.o.al mlnd 1'1111 save him from all exaggeration."l

•

The main cause of the oonfliot lay in the Near
East, and its authors were Germany and Austria on
the one side, Russi a and Serbia on the other • ; •
But for a qUarter of a century the destinies of
FrlUloe hal! been linked with those of Russl a, and,
when the long-expeoted cr1 si s .arrived, she took '
her place at the Side crt her partner with as lHtle
hesitation as Germany at the side of Austri a. She
had no desire for war, and took no step to precl pltate
it. But she had never abandoned the hope of reOOTAr
ing the Rhine provinces, and for .that reason could not
be Inoluded among the "satiated Powers" who are the
most eff,ective ohampions of peaoe. The oatastrophe
long feared by Jaures, Who was assassinated by a
Nationalist on the eve of war, had oome to pass
and Franoe was :dragged into a desperate confliot by
the ambltions of her ally. To have decllned the
summons would have constituted disloyalty to her
treaty obligations, lncreased the contp.~pt for a
"decadent Power" Whi ch w.a s entertalned beyond the
Rhine, and have left her defenceless against the
victorious Teuton.
Pierre Renouvin, the Boted Frenoh historian on the causes
of the World War, has wr1 tten in his Immediate Qr',g1 ns of the War,

1. Goooh, 'Rist 017 of Jlodem Europe, 515.

2 . Ibid., &51.
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in 1928:
• . • . Of course, after U. Po'. l"car~' s v' S1 t to
st. Petersburg, and after the reassuring st ateroent s
made by Y. Pal'llologue, Russ~ a knew that France would
live up to "the obligations of the alliance". An~,
aooording to the reports from her Amb&ssador in L~ndon,
regarding '!he personal sympatb! es of SI r Edward Grey,
she knew that she m1ght also count on a frjendly atti
tude on the part of England. It is entirely possible,
and even quIte likely, that this knowledge .about the
other members of the Entente served as a k1nd of en
oouragement at St .Petersburg. Ne' ther Fran ae nor
England had ral. sed any funil.amental objeattCl! to the
idea of RussIan parttal mobil~zatton. But d~d that
mean that she was LOW free to proaeed to ~ore ~xtp.ns1ve
measures? The EngH sh Amb assao.or had advl se(1 Sazonov
to avo,d going as far as general mobilization, and
the ,t'renah Ambassador expressed the desl re of the
Parjs Cabinet, on the thirtieth, that Russia Should
guard against takIng any measure wM ch roi ght furn l sh
the pretext for a reply on Germany's part. Sir Edward
Grey and lI. Vl viani thus aertainly did not want
Russian general mobilization.l

,

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, the eminent Ameri aan h 1 storl an, has
expressed the following opinion aoncerning the respons1b l l1ty
of President PoInoarl, in his .Comlng of the War, 1930:
• • • • If a defini te judgment of Frenah :poliay
must be reserved until the publiaation of the French
doauments ts aompleted, there is at present but little
evidence to support the view th&t the Frenah statesmen
were seeking a favorable opportunity f')r reve.i;ahe.
On the other hand, the evidence 1 eaves no doubt
that Frenon opinIon and French statesmen were ready
to accept war if the necessi ty were presented. "Franae
does not desire war, but 1 s not afraid ot it," sa1d
M. Poincare in a speeah at Nanes late 1n 1912: and
h's words were reported by the German ambassanor
in Paris as an aaaurate retleation of the French
temper. "France", he remarked to M. Izvolaki, "is
lnaontestably disposed to peaae, and neither seeks
nor desires war; but the interventi.on of Germany
against Russia would immediately modify tM s state
of mind"; &nd he was c(}nv1.naed that "parliament
&nd public opinion would, in such case, entl rely
approve the decision o~ t he ,g ,o vernment t o lend arm
ed support to Rueai

'

a.

".

1. Renounn, Immediate Origins

ot the War, 342.

2. Schmitt, Coming of the War, ~
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.'

In the report of the proceedings of the Ameri can H-I stor'
oal

Assoc~

at1.on

Conv~nti

on of Decf'lmber, 1938, there are a few

paragraphs about the d:l soussion of l'ro-tessoTs Schm! tt and Fa:y.

..
"

That the question of the or~gi. ns of the
World War still holds the interest of many
Arner~can historians seemed to he 'nd1cated by
the very large attenda~ce at the session at
whi ch S1.dney B. Fay and Bernadotte E. SchmHt
dj scussed '1 ts present status. Both BIle'akers
declared in the main that they stood by the
essential findings as presented in their
respect~. ve publ i shed works on the ori.gins of
the war. • • • Mr. Fa:y turned to the present
status of the "war guilt" question in different
countries • • • • the speaker indj cated SOMe
of the changes he would now make j n rev!. sing
M.s Origins of the World War. In particular,
he would give more attent~o"£ to econom1c and
psychological causes • • • •

•

This printed report does not mention any reVision of Mr. Fay's
conclusions concerning Pres' dent

Poj. ncar~,

but r.e -I s reported,

on good authority, as saying on that occasion that he now
recognizes that he was too severe in his Judgment of M. Poin
care when wrHing his book and that, in preparing a

re~sion,

he expects to deal more leni ently with M. Poincare's acts. 2
It is certain that his rev i sed opinion is in some considerable
degree the result o-t his examination of .the documentary

publ~

cation of the French Government, the appearance of wh-lch was
held to be the chief basis for the present revi.ew of the eVi-

.
dence on M. Poincare's role in th.e pre-war negot -I ati ons.

./

,.

In his se.rie. of volumes entitled Au Service de la France,
whi oh wa a trll1lelat ed as the Kemoi rs

.2!.

Raymond Poincare, Pre si

1. Re.po rt arnit1ed WHi8ttlry ,and Hi.t or'-ans at Chi eat;o" , i n
.lmer~e 8J1 H\ st or~. o. Review, LXIV, (April, 1939), 490-1.
2. Reported \i Protessor A. D. Beeler, April 28, 1939.
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dent Poinoare has given hiS version ot the oontroversy.
ing

th~.s

Conoern

serles of books, Mr. Wolff hae WTHten:

• • • • W"e have the pioture ot a man who has
wr1tten down, pressrved, and set ln order h 1 a Whole
record, the great events and with no less oare the
little ones, and who's able to say at any moment:
"Here in tront ot you 1 s the whole story ot my Hte
and my aotions; my doouments are 1n perfeot order:"
~ and oonstantly he br1ngs forward M.s ev:I.denoe trom
his .doouments. A Frenoh politIoian who has had
glimpses into the pr1vate life ot the great has told
me that every ni ght before going to sleep Po~ noare
oonscientiously wrote up hi s diary • . • • But more
preci ous to hi m than ruM es is hi s metloulously De at
reoord when he is defending himself against hi s ad
versaries and critios. One oan feel at every stage
hiS sense ot triumph when, thanks to thi s perfeotion
of organization, he is in a posHion to produoe evi de£oe
in blaok and white to bring an opponent to oonfusion.

:

•

President Poinoare has stated that the Triple Entente diplomats
tried in every possible way to prevent the War, whereas the
Central Powers did not know how or would not do so .2

He has ably

deal t with an aoousatIon that he failed to follow up a oerta1 n
propo sal that might have prevented or ret arded the war by quot
ing a letter of M. Berthelot to the effeot that Frenoh politi oians
did everything possible tn 1914 to avert war.:3

Fresl dent Poinoare

has written, oonoerning ,Ambassador I svolsky' s insinuati.ons:
Ot oourse.in Paris, aooording to Isvolsky,
there was. a ohiet ot state,putted up with
vani ty and for whom the witne ss ot the Russian
Amb assador was suffi.oient to determ i ne hi stor
ians to agree with hi m as to thei r judgment.
But anyhow thi s megalomaniao presIdent could
do nothing hy himself; he had no right either
to sign a deci sion without the countersign ot
a lili.hister,or in any way to put himself in
the place ot the responsible Government, or
to .ay~ will proo1 aim a 'state ot siege'
:o.r I. wi ll JUt my ad:nrsaries in pri son".

1. Woltt, 'l'he Eve of 1914, 115.

2. Kellloirs? l!iYmont Poinoare, 11, 206-'7.·
3. Ibid., 259-61.

'.
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And. his M ~n l. sters were men of peace, quite aware
of thei.r respons i M.llt i es, and quI te able to restraIn
or repudiate hIm j f he stepped out of h~ s own part. l

Coneemin& bi. retUl"ll to France at·ter h-. Journey to Russia,

:'

P res1 d ent Fo!nc ar~ ha s stat ed:

A little after 8 A.M. on the 29th we dlsembark
ed at Dunldrk, and among those assembled to greet us
there are a few who say, "~hy did you not come
back sooner now that Europe :I. s so anxious and France
in possIble danger?" One of my lntervlewers went
a 11. ttle fll:rther In t elHng me, "We have had enough
of this! It's the same thing over and over aga~n! '
It would be hetter to fin~ sh with i t once and for
all". To Mm I can only reply, "For the love of
heaven .don't talk so; we must strive to avert war. 2
He has sai d that he was e spec i ally careful to be neutral

•

j

n hl s

conduct during the prewar negot l ations.
lry positi on as Presl dent was Just now 1 n
many respects painfully passlve; I presided over
Cabinet Councils, I oonferred with the Y~ nisters
who came to see me and read all the telegrams
and reports whI ch they brought. Rut intensely
loyal as all the !!~n i sters were In letting me
know everything that WBS going on, I felt that
they were oonsti tuti on ally re"!!ponsi ble and that
full freedom of aotion must be left to them.
Thi s only made me a prey to every emotion, and
through the long hours of tho se long days I was
constantly having to hold myself In tIghtly, lest
I should do anythIng to add to the troubles of
others, while over and over aga!n I asked myself
If Europe were really goIng to be pluneed Into
a bloody w",r Just because Austria was bent on
noIsily rattling Germany's sword. 3

"

1 • •emo1r8 ' of 1l!;lIllOl'Jd·Poincarfl, Il, 291.
2. Ibid., 214.
s. Ibid., 24:2.

,.
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CHAPTER VII

co. WCLUSI 0.1'1'
Before stating my oonclusion about the respons'lbillty of

~

Presl dent Poincarll during the d.ays immedi ately preceeding the
outbreak of the World War, it is first necessary to def1ne my
interpretation of the meaning of the word "respons1b l llty".
The terI!l "respor..sibility" may be vi ewed, in t .h i s case, either
as a conscious attempt to bring about a World War, or as a
responslbil1 ty fo!" acts which, .nile not premeditated ir, order
to lncite war, may have been links i n 'the ohain of events whIch
led toward that war.

In respect to t'he former l. nterpretatton,

the documents and wri t i ngs ·wh1.ch I have consul t .e d or.. thI s sub
Ject have not, in my opinion, given oonclusive evidence that
PresJ.dent Potncare actually plotted to
Central Powers.

~ ncite

a war ae;ainst the

As for the latter 'Interpretation of the word

"responsl.b i lity", it s eems to me, there may be found consider
able room for difference of opinion.
President

Poincar~

believed that some day there would be a

war between France and Germany.

~e

could foresee th i s as the

result of the various alliances, ententes, and " i nc 5dente" that
had occurred since 1871.

He dtd not intend that France should

be cauaht tla,l)ping llBaini he did intend that Franoe should be
thorouahly prepared, bJ means of the three-year ati l 1tary serrioe
law and her Allianoe p d Ent ent e , 'for nGh a ool!f11ot.

'I'he·

wisdoll of such a course was shown in the outcome of the World
War.

-

,.'

On hl strip t n Russi a, Presld.ent Pol ncare felt t.hat 1 twas
n,ecessary to reaff! rl!l the solidar! t~ of the

Franao~Russi

an All!

anos - wM,ch had been made by Fresident Carnot and Alexander III.
But

suoh .. routine :J'eatt1 r m.ation wh~ ch , in the communique~ ,spoke

;

of a hope for pe ."ae in Europe was not nace ssari1y an act to 1nc1 te
Russia toward war.
peace in Europe.

It was a step taken in the dlreation of

ke~ping

However, evell a sel!m 1 ngly !.rmocuous statement may

have been 1 nterllreted as a prom 1. se, a carte ' blanche.

Russ 1 a, Since

the Russo-Japanese War o'f 1904-1905 when France (Ud not support her
ally, (although the Alliance did not call for a 1 d in such an eventu
ality), was not ent're1y sure of her ally.

In 1905 i t seemed poss

i ble t hat the Tsar mi ght be won over to the s1.de of
fore, 1t WaS more necessary than

usu~

Ger!!!an~.

for the French

reaffirm adherence to the lIro:'!1sions of the All!.ance.

There

Go~ernment

~nch

to

Atate

ments may h ave been cons i dered by Russian Jingoists as prorn!ses
' of aid in any eventuality.

There1 n l!. es a oertain degree of respon

si bil!.ty.
After he had returTled to France, F-resident POi n care support
ed every attempt made to avert war between Austria- Hungary and
SerbI a.

He saw to it that advice was sent to Russla to avoid, if

possible, g;ving GeTl!lany an excuse for declaI"!.ng war.
to avoi d breaking off relations w1th Germany.

France tr1 en

But even ;f France
/

had prom'sed to remain neutral in the event of a
there was the contingent

pro»ositi~n

whicih would have been prollosed next.

Rus~o-German

War,

td the German ultimatum
Certainly no sovereign state

. 0rt117 ot the nallls could haTS givslIl up two v!Uuabl:e :r ortresses
OD d!!'aand. :ror occuliatioD by another Powsr as

,.

* gBl:s

..

o:rits neutral

65

ity.

SUoh a

propos~tIon

- by ita authors.

Was

~rnposs1ble,

and It was so intended

The German ultImatum could not have been accepted

in all ita part . b7

11

FrllDce wh1.ch expected to remain Boveretgn in

her own t errit ory.
Presi.dent Poincare pll\Yed hi s part in such a way as to gIve
110

offense to England In order to reta1 n for Frar.ce Brl tl.sh ai"a

in a possIble war.
1 ng

war.

He accepted the

Frl.t~sh

proposals for evert

He asked for a Br1 ti sh <l.eclaration of future aid to

Franoe in the event of a Franco.-German war because he
that such a declaration would
War.

d~ssuade

Germany from entering the
Fra~nce,

SUch a result was of course problematical.

concentrating her fleet in

the

1:> p~ 1eved

after

Y.ed1 terrane an Sea, as pro vi ded 1 n

her 1912 agreement, ask·ed for protection by the English fleet
along her vulnerable Atlantl c Ocean-North Sea coast11ne.
too, seems only a natural request.

France oertair.ly

tr~

Thi s,
ed to

get England on her slde, not 88a1.nst her.
President Poincare beli eved in preparedness I\nd worked to
ward that end, but some of his actions toward that end may have
unconsciously led toward the beginning of the World War.

Hts

respol'lsibil1 ty was, in my ollinion, not a premedItated scheming
to bring about a

ge~eral

European war.

His responsibility was
/'

the responsIbility of any government head who believed in the
theory that in order to have peaoe it was neoessary to prepare
for war and also in the dootrine of the inevitahHity of war.

,.
...

'
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